A questão entre Israel e a Palestina
Fonte Mundo do Vestibular
Palestina (do original Filistina – “Terra dos Filisteus”) é o nome dado desde a Antigüidade à região do Oriente Próximo (impropriamente chamado de “Oriente Médio”), localizada ao sul do Líbano e a nordeste da Península do Sinai, entre o Mar Mediterrâneo e o vale do Rio Jordão.
Trata-se da Canaã bíblica, que os judeus tradicionalistas preferem chamar de Sion. A Palestina foi conquistada pelos hebreus ou israelitas (mais tarde também conhecidos como judeus) por volta de 1200 a.C., depois que aquele povo se retirou do Egito, onde vivera por alguns séculos.
Mas as sucessivas dominações estrangeiras, começadas com a tomada de Jerusalém (587 a.C.) por Nabucodonosor, rei da Babilônia, deram início a um progressivo processo de diáspora (dispersão) da população judaica, embora sua grande maioria ainda permanecesse na Palestina.
As duas rebeliões dos judeus contra o domínio romano (em 66-70 e 133-135 d.C.) tiveram resultados desastrosos. Ao debelar a primeira revolta, o general (mais tarde imperador) Tito arrasou o Templo de Jerusalém, do qual restou apenas o Muro das Lamentações. E o imperador Adriano, ao sufocar a segunda, intensificou a diáspora e proibiu os judeus de viver em Jerusalém.A partir de então, os israelitas espalharam-se pelo Império Romano; alguns grupos emigraram para a Mesopotâmia e outros pontos do Oriente Médio, fora do poder de Roma. A partir de então, a Palestina passou a ser habitada por populações helenísticas romanizadas; e, em 395, quando da divisão do Império Romano, tornou-se uma província do Império Romano do Oriente (ou Império Bizantino). Em 638, a região foi conquistada pelos árabes, no contexto da expansão do islamismo, e passou a fazer parte do mundo árabe, embora sua situação política oscilasse ao sabor das constantes lutas entre governos muçulmanos rivais. Chegou até mesmo a constituir um Estado cristão fundado pelos cruzados (1099-1187). Finalmente, de 1517 a 1918, a Palestina foi incorporada ao imenso Império Otomano (ou Império Turco). Deve-se, a propósito, lembrar que os turcos, e embora muçulmanos, não pertencem à etnia árabe. Em 1896, o escritor austríaco de origem judaica Theodor Herzl fundou o Movimento Sionista, que pregava a criação de um Estado judeu na antiga pátria dos hebreus.
Esse projeto, aprovado em um congresso israelita reunido em Genebra, teve ampla ressonância junto à comunidade judaica internacional e foi apoiado sobretudo pelo governo britânico (apoio oficializado em 1917, em plena Primeira Guerra Mundial, pela Declaração Balfour).
No início do século XX, já existiam na região pequenas comunidades israelitas, vivendo em meio à população predominantemente árabe. A partir de então, novos núcleos começaram a ser instalados, geralmente mediante compra de terras aos árabes palestinos. Durante a Primeira Guerra Mundial, a Turquia lutou ao lado da Alemanha e, derrotada, viu-se privada de todas as suas possessões no mundo árabe. A Palestina passou então a ser administrada pela Grã-Bretanha, mediante mandato concedido pela Liga das Nações. Depois de 1918, a imigração de judeus para a Palestina ganhou impulso, o que começou a gerar inquietação no seio da população árabe. A crescente hostilidade desta última levou os colonos judeus a criar uma organização paramilitar – a Haganah – a princípio voltada para a autodefesa e mais tarde também para operações de ataque contra os árabes.
Apesar do conteúdo da Declaração Balfour, favorável à criação de um Estado judeu, a Grã-Bretanha tentou frear o movimento imigratório para não descontentar os Estados muçulmanos do Oriente Médio, com quem mantinha proveitosas relações econômicas; mas viu-se confrontada pela pressão mundial da coletividade israelita e, dentro da própria Palestina, pela ação de organizações terroristas. Após a Segunda Guerra Mundial, o fluxo de imigrantes judeus tornou-se irresistível. Em 1947, a Assembléia Geral da ONU decidiu dividir a Palestina em dois Estados independentes: um judeu e outro palestino. Mas tanto os palestinos como os Estados árabes vizinhos recusaram-se a acatar a partilha proposta pela ONU. Em 14 de maio de 1948, foi proclamado o Estado de Israel, que se viu imediatamente atacado pelo Egito, Arábia Saudita, Jordânia, Iraque, Síria e Líbano (1ª Guerra Árabe-Israelense). Os árabes foram derrotados e Israel passou a controlar 75% do território palestino. A partir daí, iniciou-se o êxodo dos palestinos para os países vizinhos. Atualmente, esses refugiados somam cerca de 3 milhões. Os 25% restantes da Palestina, correspondentes à Faixa de Gaza e à Cisjordânia, ficaram sob ocupação respectivamente do Egito e da Jordânia.
Note-se que a Cisjordânia incluía a parte oriental de Jerusalém, onde fica a Cidade Velha, de grande importância histórica e religiosa.
08/11/2007
Globalização, integração e Estado Nacional no mundo contemporâneo
Globalização, integração e Estado Nacional no mundo contemporâneo
Jul 27th, 2007 by Amado Cervo
Neste artigo não se focaliza a definição dos três conceitos - globalização, integração e papel do Estado Nacional - utilizados para analisar as relações internacionais contemporâneas desde o fim da Guerra Fria. Manipula esses fenômenos, na expectativa de contribuir para sua compreensão, mas tem por escopo o nexo entre eles. Considera plausível tomar este nexo seja como determinante seja como efeito da evolução dos referidos fenômenos.
Os internacionalistas que buscaram compreensão para a transição da ordem internacional da Guerra Fria rumo às linhas de força das relações internacionais dos anos 1990 insistiram, como sabemos, sobre o fenômeno da globalização, mas o aproximavam de outro fenômeno, a integração, visto que estabeleciam uma espécie de disputa entre ambos, na suposição de que dessa disputa haveria de resultar o equilíbrio no controle da ordem. De todo modo, esses dois fenômenos eram vistos como tendências de fundo das relações internacionais, ambos contribuindo para colocar em xeque o Estado Nacional como força profunda de mesma envergadura.
Eis que no início do século XXI, contrariando essa última convicção, percebe-se o Estado Nacional desempenhando funções anteriores à transição dos anos 1990 em alguns casos, agregando novas funções em outros, mas o mais curioso é que o Estado passa por vezes, na mesma nação, de uma função a outra.
Nossa reflexão trabalha com duas idéias centrais. Na primeira parte, analisamos as duas tendências das relações internacionais de 1990 a nossos dias - globalização e integração - e o papel que desempenham os Estados Nacionais nesse contexto, tomando como apoio autores que nos são mais próximos. Aprofundamos, na segunda parte, o nexo entre tais fenômenos na América do Sul, à luz das experiências históricas regionais, com o fim de estabelecer modelos para análise das relações internacionais da região.
I - DUAS TENDÊNCIAS DAS RELAÇÕES INTERNACIONAIS DESDE 1990: GLOBALIZAÇÃO E INTEGRAÇÃO
Uma interpretação das relações internacionais que fez sucesso no início da década de 1990 comportava grave equívoco histórico: a interpretação segundo a qual a globalização era fenômeno recente, uma nova fase da evolução do capitalismo, posta em marcha com o fim do socialismo real. Essa interpretação vinha geralmente acompanhada de outro equívoco, de caráter normativo, apregoar a falência do Estado Nacional. A interpretação era formulada por analistas das relações internacionais que não levavam em conta as tendências da História de séculos anteriores, pelo menos dos quatro últimos séculos, seja porque as desconheciam, seja porque argumentavam à luz de convicções derivadas do imediato ou de fundamento ideológico. Era mais nítido, no caso do segundo equívoco, o fundamento ideológico da argumentação, derivada da crença segundo a qual o mercado norteia por si as tendências de fundo da História, alheio à influência de idéias e ação dos homens de Estado para a realização de interesses nacionais.
O poder das idéias, entretanto, corretas ou não, segue um curso que nem sempre se baliza pela lógica que aprendemos nas aulas de filosofia. Aprendi tal lição ao ler o recente livro Cultura e Poder de meu colega Estevão Chaves de Rezende Martins. Os internacionalistas equivocados expunham suas convicções pelo ensino e reproduziam seus argumentos aos quatro ventos. O meio político, no mundo todo, deixava-se seduzir. A opinião pública era penetrada e o resultado eleitoral afetado. Governos eleitos brandiam suas novas plataformas de ação: modificar o ordenamento interno, isto é, o substrato legal e institucional, adaptando-o às duas tendências do momento: globalização e retirada de cena do Estado tradicional, seja o desenvolvimentista na periferia, seja o do bem-estar no centro.
Localizamos uma versão consistente desses equívocos nos escritos de Fernando Henrique Cardoso publicados na década de 1990: mudam-se os tempos, insistia o sociólogo brasileiro das relações internacionais, Presidente da República. Por certo, os tempos mudavam. Mesmo que não fossem fenômenos recentes, mesmo que não requisitassem a falência do Estado, globalização e integração eram tendências hegemônicas em curso nas relações internacionais.
Sobretudo a primeira, que conformava o mercado mundial de consumo, estabelecia a convergência ideológica em torno do capitalismo, a hierarquia das potências com os Estados Unidos no topo da pirâmide, a unificação dos processos técnicos e dos sistemas produtivos no mundo, a expansão da transnacionalidade empresarial, a cidadania universal que se conferia ao capital etc. Temerosos diante de possíveis efeitos negativos dessa força da História, os Estados reagiam, agrupando-se em blocos com o fim de domá-los ou simplesmente proteger-se.
O itinerário da contestação dos equívocos, erigidos em dogma pelo pensamento neoliberal latino-americano, passou por duas fases: uma tímida e sem muita expressão - a fase cética - outra consistente e alardeada, a fase crítica: será mesmo a globalização nova e definitiva tendência histórica, estará mesmo o Estado Nacional condenado ao sono eterno diante das mudanças em curso?
Tomamos a liberdade de referir dois grupos com os quais envolvemos nossos estudos, grupos estes que publicaram cerca de duas dezenas de livros na virada do século e desfizeram os equívocos acima mencionados à luz de objetiva análise, com sólida fundamentação histórica. O grupo argentino, constituído entre outros pelo economista Aldo Ferrer, o internacionalista Raúl Bernal-Meza e o historiador das relações internacionais Mario Rapoport, por um lado, e a escola de Brasília, denominação atribuída por Bernal-Meza ao segundo grupo, aqui representado por alguns pesquisadores.
Céticos em um primeiro momento, embora não calados, porque faziam da sala de aula o campo de expressão, críticos quando amadureciam seus argumentos e os veiculavam em publicações, os dois grupos chegavam a conclusões convergentes. A globalização não representa fenômeno nem tendência recentes, apenas seu ritmo mais acelerado e sua expansão a penetrar economia e sociedade de modo horizontal e vertical. A falência do Estado Nacional não vai além de uma suposição irrealista, porquanto é ele o arquiteto da globalização e o inventor dos blocos de defesa diante dela ou de controle de efeitos.
Os dois grupos aprofundaram o estudo dos fenômenos da globalização e da integração. Acabaram por estabelecer duas fases históricas de 1990 a nossos dias, ao descrever a evolução dessas tendências. A primeira estende-se, grosso modo, de 1990 a 2000 e a segunda pertence ao novo século. Caracterizamos a ambas, sucintamente.
A década dos noventa estabeleceu um certo equilíbrio entre as duas forças profundas da História, globalização e integração. Ambas as tendências avançavam a olhos vistos, uma globalização horizontal e vertical a moldar a ordem internacional em sua essência, a criação ou a consolidação de blocos de países, de matiz tanto econômica quanto política, como a UE, o Nafta, o Mercosul, a Apec etc. Estar-se-ia montando uma ordem global, de forte vertente regional?
Quando adentramos o século XXI, revelou-se que nada disso era seguro. Na História não há tendência irreversível nem mecanismo de aplicação automática. O que é humano é contingente, por isso não há teoria duradoura para explicar definitivamente os fenômenos como no campo da física ou da biologia.
Com efeito, os estudos mostram que não era definitivo o equilíbrio no controle da ordem internacional a partir das duas tendências em curso, a globalização impelida pelas estruturas hegemônicas do capitalismo, tomada pela periferia como padrão sem escolha, e a integração que lhe disputava espaço na conformação da ordem. Três novos fenômenos irrompem no século XXI, com capacidade de influência talvez não comparável aos dois anteriores, porém em condições de chacoalhar os alicerces do novo mundo.
Por um lado, a desastrosa experiência neoliberal da América Latina, que revelou a ideologia sobre a qual se fundava a crença de intelectuais e políticos acerca da capacidade ilimitada do mercado em prover o desenvolvimento e o bem-estar, mesmo o fortalecimento econômico. Por outro, a crise do multilateralismo, que também reverteu a tendência de reforçar a globalização por meio de instituições, regimes e ordenamentos universais no campo do comércio, das finanças, da segurança, dos direitos humanos, do meio ambiente etc. Enfim, o retorno do Estado Nacional, que se imiscui em meio a tais fenômenos, no qual voltam a se pendurar as esperanças e a segurança dos cidadãos, passado o encanto e emudecido o canto de sereia de globalistas e integracionistas.
II - O NEXO ENTRE ESTADO NACIONAL, GLOBALIZAÇÃO E INTEGRAÇÃO NA AMÉRICA DO SUL NO SÉCULO XXI
A explosão das torres gêmeas em 2001 não abalou apenas os Estados Unidos, mas pela importância que lhe atribuiu a primeira potência global, tornou-se problema de todos. Com efeito, o fato não apenas simboliza, mas marca a passagem para a introspecção nacional em todo o mundo. Se não, por que os Estados Unidos se refugiam em evidente unilateralismo de conduta, a União Européia vê sua unidade política e seu projeto econômico recusado por alguns países sob variados pretextos, por que os nacionalismos ressurgem nos bálcãs e na antiga União Soviética, por que os grandes países asiáticos, como China e Índia, implementam projeto próprio de desenvolvimento, por que o Oriente Médio se torna palco de intervenções decididas por governos e não pela ONU?
A segunda fase de evolução da ordem internacional que estamos descrevendo não surpreendeu a América do Sul, cujos governos já andavam envoltos com a deterioração das condições sociais e econômicas provocada pelas experiências neoliberais. Nessa região, o retorno do Estado Nacional ocorreu por esta última razão, mas encontrou por certo condições favoráveis no ambiente internacional. Percebem-se dois traços regionais dessas mudanças: a crise dos processos de integração regional, Mercosul, Comunidade Andina, fusão ou expansão de quê; a busca de soluções para as dificuldades nacionais desde uma perspectiva dos Estados Nacionais, ao invés de soluções regionais ou globalistas.
A América do Sul, contudo, não apresenta unidade de conduta em termos de política exterior ou modelo de inserção internacional no século XXI, como ostentara na última década do XX. Tanto é, que podemos expor, a seguir, três modelos de Estado que reagem diante das tendências de globalização e integração, o brasileiro-chileno, o venezuelano-boliviano e o argentino.
Brasil e Chile: modelo globalista com diferente linearidade
Por certo, esses dois países se encontram sobre o leito profundo da tendência histórica da globalização, como solteiros, contudo, não como casal. Isso porque compõem bem o modelo de países globalistas por um lado, mas reagem de forma distinta, por outro. O Chile persegue a globalização estruturalmente dependente de país periférico primário, dito liberal-exportador, ao passo que o Brasil coloca sua vocação industrial no topo dos valores da alta política internacional. Assim, o primeiro corre atrás do acordo de livre comércio com os Estados Unidos, ao passo que o segundo bloqueia a criação da Alça, recusa aquele e outros acordos bilaterais ou interblocos que estabeleçam a perpetuação das estruturas hegemônicas do capitalismo sobre países emergentes, enfim reforça seu poder em coalizões decididas a bloquear a produção do ordenamento ou de regimes globais que não realizem a reciprocidade real dos interesses entre estruturas hegemônicas e países periféricos.
Embora distantes em sua visão de mundo e em seus objetivos externos, é notável a conduta logística dos Estados, no Chile e no Brasil, a secundar a sociedade, que anda por si, mas conduzida pela mão, não da providência, mas da dirigência nacional. Para o Chile, mercados externos para os produtos da terra; para o Brasil, mercado para produtos agrícolas e industrializados, internacionalização de empresas de matriz nacional, diplomacia multilateralista de reciprocidade real no mundo da interdependência global. Para o Chile, juros baixos, combate à especulação financeira e elevada taxa de crescimento; para o Brasil, elevada taxa de juros, especulação financeira e crescimento medíocre. Para o Chile, integração regional secundária, visto que a meta externa prioritária consiste em alcançar pela via do livre comércio mercados em condições privilegiadas; para o Brasil, integração regional sobrevalorizada, atrelada a seu projeto sul-americano de integração produtiva.
Venezuela e Bolívia: modelo intervencionista anterior à recente globalização
Os dois países andinos se alinham em um modelo comum de inserção internacional, porém com especificidades nacionais fortes, a exemplo dos casos anteriores. Venezuela e Bolívia agridem a globalização pelo discurso político, regridem a modelo de intervenção estatal pré-globalista com nacionalizações de empresas privadas e forte nacionalismo político e social, fundamentam o desenvolvimento sobre o capital provindo de recursos naturais ao invés dos fluxos de investimentos externos. Contudo, a Venezuela se abre a vasta cooperação internacional de capitais e empreendimentos, mantém sua vocação de país industrial e acompanha o Brasil em projeto regional de integração produtiva; ao passo que a Bolívia afugenta o capital e o empreendimento estrangeiros, distribui renda ao invés de distribuir trabalho, não assimila conceito algum de integração regional e se isola conscientemente.
Argentina: modelo de introspecção nacional
Nesse início do século XXI, o nexo entre Estado Nacional, globalização e integração configura na Argentina modelo diferente relativamente aos dois anteriores. Nesse modelo argentino não prevalecem a logística da globalização como no Chile e no Brasil, tampouco a intervenção econômica estatal, em dose comparável ao que sucede na Venezuela e na Bolívia. Fortalece-se, contudo, o papel do Estado. A Argentina busca soluções de dentro para os problemas gerados pela crise do neoliberalismo, que foram os mais graves da região. Por tal razão, globalização e integração caem para segundo plano nas estratégias de ação interna e externa. O lastro histórico econômico e social da nação, o mais robusto e bem distribuído dentre todos os países da América do Sul, parece suficiente para arrancar de dentro as forças com que manter a estabilidade, combater a especulação financeira, atrair capital e empreendimentos e exibir elevado ritmo de crescimento. Em suma, o modelo de introspecção nacional funciona e produz resultados. A integração é vista pela Argentina como integração comercialista, e essa perspectiva, conquanto dê continuidade à própria maneira de concebê-la, afasta o país do projeto brasileiro-venezuelano de integração produtiva.
Conclusões
1. Após a prevalência de três fenômenos de fundo das relações internacionais durante a última década do século XX - globalização, integração e depreciação do Estado Nacional - o mundo entra em fase de crise, com retorno do Estado e explícita incapacidade de fazer avançar o ordenamento multilateral global como também os processos de formação de blocos.
2. A América do Sul revela no período traços semelhantes, porém introduz seus próprios modelos de relações internacionais, em situação bem distinta da década anterior em que o neoliberalismo perfazia a unidade.
3. A não convergência de modelos regionais na América do Sul - países globalistas, liberais ou industrialistas, países estatistas ou de introspecção nacional - conforma um tabuleiro político, no qual o entendimento sobre a ação regional e global não ocorre, a integração não avança e cada qual insiste em perseguir destino próprio, desarticulado do conjunto.
4. Dois cenários futuros para as relações internacionais da região podem ser traçados: o malogro do projeto desenvolvimentista brasileiro de integração produtiva, a começar pela integração energética, em razão dos nacionalismos em voga, e o aprofundamento da inserção globalista de caráter logístico do Brasil; o sucesso da integração produtiva regional e a criação de um pólo de poder sul-americano.
Jul 27th, 2007 by Amado Cervo
Neste artigo não se focaliza a definição dos três conceitos - globalização, integração e papel do Estado Nacional - utilizados para analisar as relações internacionais contemporâneas desde o fim da Guerra Fria. Manipula esses fenômenos, na expectativa de contribuir para sua compreensão, mas tem por escopo o nexo entre eles. Considera plausível tomar este nexo seja como determinante seja como efeito da evolução dos referidos fenômenos.
Os internacionalistas que buscaram compreensão para a transição da ordem internacional da Guerra Fria rumo às linhas de força das relações internacionais dos anos 1990 insistiram, como sabemos, sobre o fenômeno da globalização, mas o aproximavam de outro fenômeno, a integração, visto que estabeleciam uma espécie de disputa entre ambos, na suposição de que dessa disputa haveria de resultar o equilíbrio no controle da ordem. De todo modo, esses dois fenômenos eram vistos como tendências de fundo das relações internacionais, ambos contribuindo para colocar em xeque o Estado Nacional como força profunda de mesma envergadura.
Eis que no início do século XXI, contrariando essa última convicção, percebe-se o Estado Nacional desempenhando funções anteriores à transição dos anos 1990 em alguns casos, agregando novas funções em outros, mas o mais curioso é que o Estado passa por vezes, na mesma nação, de uma função a outra.
Nossa reflexão trabalha com duas idéias centrais. Na primeira parte, analisamos as duas tendências das relações internacionais de 1990 a nossos dias - globalização e integração - e o papel que desempenham os Estados Nacionais nesse contexto, tomando como apoio autores que nos são mais próximos. Aprofundamos, na segunda parte, o nexo entre tais fenômenos na América do Sul, à luz das experiências históricas regionais, com o fim de estabelecer modelos para análise das relações internacionais da região.
I - DUAS TENDÊNCIAS DAS RELAÇÕES INTERNACIONAIS DESDE 1990: GLOBALIZAÇÃO E INTEGRAÇÃO
Uma interpretação das relações internacionais que fez sucesso no início da década de 1990 comportava grave equívoco histórico: a interpretação segundo a qual a globalização era fenômeno recente, uma nova fase da evolução do capitalismo, posta em marcha com o fim do socialismo real. Essa interpretação vinha geralmente acompanhada de outro equívoco, de caráter normativo, apregoar a falência do Estado Nacional. A interpretação era formulada por analistas das relações internacionais que não levavam em conta as tendências da História de séculos anteriores, pelo menos dos quatro últimos séculos, seja porque as desconheciam, seja porque argumentavam à luz de convicções derivadas do imediato ou de fundamento ideológico. Era mais nítido, no caso do segundo equívoco, o fundamento ideológico da argumentação, derivada da crença segundo a qual o mercado norteia por si as tendências de fundo da História, alheio à influência de idéias e ação dos homens de Estado para a realização de interesses nacionais.
O poder das idéias, entretanto, corretas ou não, segue um curso que nem sempre se baliza pela lógica que aprendemos nas aulas de filosofia. Aprendi tal lição ao ler o recente livro Cultura e Poder de meu colega Estevão Chaves de Rezende Martins. Os internacionalistas equivocados expunham suas convicções pelo ensino e reproduziam seus argumentos aos quatro ventos. O meio político, no mundo todo, deixava-se seduzir. A opinião pública era penetrada e o resultado eleitoral afetado. Governos eleitos brandiam suas novas plataformas de ação: modificar o ordenamento interno, isto é, o substrato legal e institucional, adaptando-o às duas tendências do momento: globalização e retirada de cena do Estado tradicional, seja o desenvolvimentista na periferia, seja o do bem-estar no centro.
Localizamos uma versão consistente desses equívocos nos escritos de Fernando Henrique Cardoso publicados na década de 1990: mudam-se os tempos, insistia o sociólogo brasileiro das relações internacionais, Presidente da República. Por certo, os tempos mudavam. Mesmo que não fossem fenômenos recentes, mesmo que não requisitassem a falência do Estado, globalização e integração eram tendências hegemônicas em curso nas relações internacionais.
Sobretudo a primeira, que conformava o mercado mundial de consumo, estabelecia a convergência ideológica em torno do capitalismo, a hierarquia das potências com os Estados Unidos no topo da pirâmide, a unificação dos processos técnicos e dos sistemas produtivos no mundo, a expansão da transnacionalidade empresarial, a cidadania universal que se conferia ao capital etc. Temerosos diante de possíveis efeitos negativos dessa força da História, os Estados reagiam, agrupando-se em blocos com o fim de domá-los ou simplesmente proteger-se.
O itinerário da contestação dos equívocos, erigidos em dogma pelo pensamento neoliberal latino-americano, passou por duas fases: uma tímida e sem muita expressão - a fase cética - outra consistente e alardeada, a fase crítica: será mesmo a globalização nova e definitiva tendência histórica, estará mesmo o Estado Nacional condenado ao sono eterno diante das mudanças em curso?
Tomamos a liberdade de referir dois grupos com os quais envolvemos nossos estudos, grupos estes que publicaram cerca de duas dezenas de livros na virada do século e desfizeram os equívocos acima mencionados à luz de objetiva análise, com sólida fundamentação histórica. O grupo argentino, constituído entre outros pelo economista Aldo Ferrer, o internacionalista Raúl Bernal-Meza e o historiador das relações internacionais Mario Rapoport, por um lado, e a escola de Brasília, denominação atribuída por Bernal-Meza ao segundo grupo, aqui representado por alguns pesquisadores.
Céticos em um primeiro momento, embora não calados, porque faziam da sala de aula o campo de expressão, críticos quando amadureciam seus argumentos e os veiculavam em publicações, os dois grupos chegavam a conclusões convergentes. A globalização não representa fenômeno nem tendência recentes, apenas seu ritmo mais acelerado e sua expansão a penetrar economia e sociedade de modo horizontal e vertical. A falência do Estado Nacional não vai além de uma suposição irrealista, porquanto é ele o arquiteto da globalização e o inventor dos blocos de defesa diante dela ou de controle de efeitos.
Os dois grupos aprofundaram o estudo dos fenômenos da globalização e da integração. Acabaram por estabelecer duas fases históricas de 1990 a nossos dias, ao descrever a evolução dessas tendências. A primeira estende-se, grosso modo, de 1990 a 2000 e a segunda pertence ao novo século. Caracterizamos a ambas, sucintamente.
A década dos noventa estabeleceu um certo equilíbrio entre as duas forças profundas da História, globalização e integração. Ambas as tendências avançavam a olhos vistos, uma globalização horizontal e vertical a moldar a ordem internacional em sua essência, a criação ou a consolidação de blocos de países, de matiz tanto econômica quanto política, como a UE, o Nafta, o Mercosul, a Apec etc. Estar-se-ia montando uma ordem global, de forte vertente regional?
Quando adentramos o século XXI, revelou-se que nada disso era seguro. Na História não há tendência irreversível nem mecanismo de aplicação automática. O que é humano é contingente, por isso não há teoria duradoura para explicar definitivamente os fenômenos como no campo da física ou da biologia.
Com efeito, os estudos mostram que não era definitivo o equilíbrio no controle da ordem internacional a partir das duas tendências em curso, a globalização impelida pelas estruturas hegemônicas do capitalismo, tomada pela periferia como padrão sem escolha, e a integração que lhe disputava espaço na conformação da ordem. Três novos fenômenos irrompem no século XXI, com capacidade de influência talvez não comparável aos dois anteriores, porém em condições de chacoalhar os alicerces do novo mundo.
Por um lado, a desastrosa experiência neoliberal da América Latina, que revelou a ideologia sobre a qual se fundava a crença de intelectuais e políticos acerca da capacidade ilimitada do mercado em prover o desenvolvimento e o bem-estar, mesmo o fortalecimento econômico. Por outro, a crise do multilateralismo, que também reverteu a tendência de reforçar a globalização por meio de instituições, regimes e ordenamentos universais no campo do comércio, das finanças, da segurança, dos direitos humanos, do meio ambiente etc. Enfim, o retorno do Estado Nacional, que se imiscui em meio a tais fenômenos, no qual voltam a se pendurar as esperanças e a segurança dos cidadãos, passado o encanto e emudecido o canto de sereia de globalistas e integracionistas.
II - O NEXO ENTRE ESTADO NACIONAL, GLOBALIZAÇÃO E INTEGRAÇÃO NA AMÉRICA DO SUL NO SÉCULO XXI
A explosão das torres gêmeas em 2001 não abalou apenas os Estados Unidos, mas pela importância que lhe atribuiu a primeira potência global, tornou-se problema de todos. Com efeito, o fato não apenas simboliza, mas marca a passagem para a introspecção nacional em todo o mundo. Se não, por que os Estados Unidos se refugiam em evidente unilateralismo de conduta, a União Européia vê sua unidade política e seu projeto econômico recusado por alguns países sob variados pretextos, por que os nacionalismos ressurgem nos bálcãs e na antiga União Soviética, por que os grandes países asiáticos, como China e Índia, implementam projeto próprio de desenvolvimento, por que o Oriente Médio se torna palco de intervenções decididas por governos e não pela ONU?
A segunda fase de evolução da ordem internacional que estamos descrevendo não surpreendeu a América do Sul, cujos governos já andavam envoltos com a deterioração das condições sociais e econômicas provocada pelas experiências neoliberais. Nessa região, o retorno do Estado Nacional ocorreu por esta última razão, mas encontrou por certo condições favoráveis no ambiente internacional. Percebem-se dois traços regionais dessas mudanças: a crise dos processos de integração regional, Mercosul, Comunidade Andina, fusão ou expansão de quê; a busca de soluções para as dificuldades nacionais desde uma perspectiva dos Estados Nacionais, ao invés de soluções regionais ou globalistas.
A América do Sul, contudo, não apresenta unidade de conduta em termos de política exterior ou modelo de inserção internacional no século XXI, como ostentara na última década do XX. Tanto é, que podemos expor, a seguir, três modelos de Estado que reagem diante das tendências de globalização e integração, o brasileiro-chileno, o venezuelano-boliviano e o argentino.
Brasil e Chile: modelo globalista com diferente linearidade
Por certo, esses dois países se encontram sobre o leito profundo da tendência histórica da globalização, como solteiros, contudo, não como casal. Isso porque compõem bem o modelo de países globalistas por um lado, mas reagem de forma distinta, por outro. O Chile persegue a globalização estruturalmente dependente de país periférico primário, dito liberal-exportador, ao passo que o Brasil coloca sua vocação industrial no topo dos valores da alta política internacional. Assim, o primeiro corre atrás do acordo de livre comércio com os Estados Unidos, ao passo que o segundo bloqueia a criação da Alça, recusa aquele e outros acordos bilaterais ou interblocos que estabeleçam a perpetuação das estruturas hegemônicas do capitalismo sobre países emergentes, enfim reforça seu poder em coalizões decididas a bloquear a produção do ordenamento ou de regimes globais que não realizem a reciprocidade real dos interesses entre estruturas hegemônicas e países periféricos.
Embora distantes em sua visão de mundo e em seus objetivos externos, é notável a conduta logística dos Estados, no Chile e no Brasil, a secundar a sociedade, que anda por si, mas conduzida pela mão, não da providência, mas da dirigência nacional. Para o Chile, mercados externos para os produtos da terra; para o Brasil, mercado para produtos agrícolas e industrializados, internacionalização de empresas de matriz nacional, diplomacia multilateralista de reciprocidade real no mundo da interdependência global. Para o Chile, juros baixos, combate à especulação financeira e elevada taxa de crescimento; para o Brasil, elevada taxa de juros, especulação financeira e crescimento medíocre. Para o Chile, integração regional secundária, visto que a meta externa prioritária consiste em alcançar pela via do livre comércio mercados em condições privilegiadas; para o Brasil, integração regional sobrevalorizada, atrelada a seu projeto sul-americano de integração produtiva.
Venezuela e Bolívia: modelo intervencionista anterior à recente globalização
Os dois países andinos se alinham em um modelo comum de inserção internacional, porém com especificidades nacionais fortes, a exemplo dos casos anteriores. Venezuela e Bolívia agridem a globalização pelo discurso político, regridem a modelo de intervenção estatal pré-globalista com nacionalizações de empresas privadas e forte nacionalismo político e social, fundamentam o desenvolvimento sobre o capital provindo de recursos naturais ao invés dos fluxos de investimentos externos. Contudo, a Venezuela se abre a vasta cooperação internacional de capitais e empreendimentos, mantém sua vocação de país industrial e acompanha o Brasil em projeto regional de integração produtiva; ao passo que a Bolívia afugenta o capital e o empreendimento estrangeiros, distribui renda ao invés de distribuir trabalho, não assimila conceito algum de integração regional e se isola conscientemente.
Argentina: modelo de introspecção nacional
Nesse início do século XXI, o nexo entre Estado Nacional, globalização e integração configura na Argentina modelo diferente relativamente aos dois anteriores. Nesse modelo argentino não prevalecem a logística da globalização como no Chile e no Brasil, tampouco a intervenção econômica estatal, em dose comparável ao que sucede na Venezuela e na Bolívia. Fortalece-se, contudo, o papel do Estado. A Argentina busca soluções de dentro para os problemas gerados pela crise do neoliberalismo, que foram os mais graves da região. Por tal razão, globalização e integração caem para segundo plano nas estratégias de ação interna e externa. O lastro histórico econômico e social da nação, o mais robusto e bem distribuído dentre todos os países da América do Sul, parece suficiente para arrancar de dentro as forças com que manter a estabilidade, combater a especulação financeira, atrair capital e empreendimentos e exibir elevado ritmo de crescimento. Em suma, o modelo de introspecção nacional funciona e produz resultados. A integração é vista pela Argentina como integração comercialista, e essa perspectiva, conquanto dê continuidade à própria maneira de concebê-la, afasta o país do projeto brasileiro-venezuelano de integração produtiva.
Conclusões
1. Após a prevalência de três fenômenos de fundo das relações internacionais durante a última década do século XX - globalização, integração e depreciação do Estado Nacional - o mundo entra em fase de crise, com retorno do Estado e explícita incapacidade de fazer avançar o ordenamento multilateral global como também os processos de formação de blocos.
2. A América do Sul revela no período traços semelhantes, porém introduz seus próprios modelos de relações internacionais, em situação bem distinta da década anterior em que o neoliberalismo perfazia a unidade.
3. A não convergência de modelos regionais na América do Sul - países globalistas, liberais ou industrialistas, países estatistas ou de introspecção nacional - conforma um tabuleiro político, no qual o entendimento sobre a ação regional e global não ocorre, a integração não avança e cada qual insiste em perseguir destino próprio, desarticulado do conjunto.
4. Dois cenários futuros para as relações internacionais da região podem ser traçados: o malogro do projeto desenvolvimentista brasileiro de integração produtiva, a começar pela integração energética, em razão dos nacionalismos em voga, e o aprofundamento da inserção globalista de caráter logístico do Brasil; o sucesso da integração produtiva regional e a criação de um pólo de poder sul-americano.
22/10/2007
After the end of empire
The sun sets early on the American Century
The ‘American Century’ only began 60 years ago. But it seems already to be over, with the disaster of Iraq forcing some of the United States’ ruling elites to realise that its hegemony has been severely weakened. But nobody seems to know what to do next, or even how to behave
By Philip S Golub
The disastrous outcome of the invasion and occupation of Iraq has caused a crisis in the power elite of the United States deeper than that resulting from defeat in Vietnam 30 years ago. Ironically, it is the very coalition of ultra-nationalists and neo-conservatives that coalesced in the 1970s, seeking to reverse the Vietnam syndrome, restore US power and revive “the will to victory”, that has caused the present crisis.
There has been no sustained popular mass protest as there was during the Vietnam war, probably because of the underclass sociology of the US’s volunteer army and the fact that the war is being funded by foreign financial flows (although no one knows how long that can continue). However, at the elite level the war has fractured the national security establishment that has run the US for six decades. The unprecedented public critique in 2006 by several retired senior officers over the conduct of the war (1), plus recurrent signs of dissent in the intelligence agencies and the State Department, reflects a much wider trend in elite opinion and key state institutions.
Not all critics are as forthright as retired General William Odom, who tirelessly repeats that the invasion of Iraq was the “greatest strategic disaster in United States history” (2), or Colonel Larry Wilkerson, Colin Powell’s former chief of staff, who denounced a “blunder of historic proportions” and has recently suggested impeaching the president (3), or former National Security Council head Zbigniew Brzezinski who called the war and occupation a “historic, strategic and moral calamity” (4).
Most public critiques from within the institutions of state focus on the way the war and occupation have been mismanaged rather than the more fundamental issue of the invasion itself. Yet discord is wide and deep: government departments are trading blame, accusing each other of the “loss of Iraq” (5). In private, former senior officials express incandescent anger, denounce shadowy cabals and have deep contempt for the White House. A former official of the National Security Council compared the president and his staff to the Corleone mafia family in The Godfather. A senior foreign policy expert said: “Due to an incompetent, arrogant and corrupt clique we are about to lose our hegemonic position in the Middle East and Gulf.” “The White House has broken the army and trampled its honour,” added a Republican senator and former Vietnam veteran.
No doves
None of these, nor any of the other institutional critics, could be considered doves: whatever their political affiliations (mostly Republican) or personal beliefs, they were – and some are still – guardians of US power, managers of the national security state, and sometimes central actors in covert and overt imperial interventions in the third world during the cold war and post-cold war. They were – and some are still – system managers of a self-perpetuating bureaucratic national security machine – first analysed by the sociologist C Wright Mills – whose function is the production and reproduction of power.
As a social group, these realists cannot be distinguished from the object of their criticism in terms of their willingness to use force or their historically demonstrated ruthlessness in achieving state aims. Nor can the cause of their dissent be attributed to conflicting convictions over ethics, norms and values (though this may be a motivating factor for some). It lies rather in the rational realisation that the war in Iraq has nearly “broken the US army” (6), weakened the national security state, and severely if not irreparably undermined “America’s global legitimacy” (7) – its ability to shape world preferences and set the global agenda. The most sophisticated expressions of dissent, such as Brzezinski’s, reflect the understanding that power is not reducible to the ability to coerce, and that, once lost, hegemonic legitimacy is hard to restore.
The signs of slippage are everywhere apparent: in Latin America, where US influence is at its lowest in decades; in East Asia, where the US has been obliged, reluctantly, to negotiate with North Korea and recognise China as an indispensable actor in regional security; in Europe, where US plans to install missile defence capabilities in Poland are being contested by Germany and other European Union states; in the Gulf, where longstanding allies such as Saudi Arabia are pursuing autonomous agendas that coincide only in part with US aims; and in the international institutions, the UN and the World Bank, where the US is no longer in a position to drive the agenda unaided.
Transnational opinion surveys show a consistent and nearly global pattern of defiance of US foreign policy as well as a more fundamental erosion in the attractiveness of the US: the narrative of the American dream has been submerged by images of a military leviathan disregarding world opinion and breaking the rules. World public opinion may not stop wars but it does count in subtler ways. Some of this slippage may be repairable under new leaders and with new and less aggressive policies. Yet it is hard to see how internal unity of purpose will be restored: it took decades to rebuild the shaken US armed forces after Vietnam and to define an elite and popular consensus on the uses of power. The mobilisation of nationalist sentiment to support foreign adventures will not be so easy after Iraq. Nor can one imagine a return to the status quo in world politics.
The invasion and occupation of Iraq is not the sole cause of the trends sketched. Rather, the war significantly accentuated all of them at a moment when larger centrifugal forces were already at work: the erosion and collapse of the Washington Consensus and the gradual rise of new gravitational centres, notably in Asia, were established trends when President George Bush went to war. Now, as the shift in the world economy towards Asia matures, the US is stuck in a conflict that is absorbing its total energies. History is moving on and the world is slipping, slowly but inexorably, out of US hands.
Destined to act as hegemon
For the US power elite this is deeply unsettling. Since the mid-20th century US leaders have thought of themselves as having a unique historic responsibility to lead and govern the globe. Sitting on top of the world since the 1940s, they have assumed that, like Great Britain in the 19th century, they were destined to act as hegemon – a dominant state having the will and the means to establish and maintain international order: peace and an open and expanding liberal world economy. In their reading of history it was Britain’s inability to sustain such a role and the US’s simultaneous unwillingness to take responsibility (isolationism) that created the conditions for the cycle of world wars and depression during the first half of the 20th century.
The corollary of this assumption is the circular argument that since order requires a dominant centre, the maintenance of order (or avoidance of chaos) requires the perpetuation of hegemony. This belief system, theorised in US academia in the 1970s as “hegemonic stability”, has underpinned US foreign policy since the second world war, when the US emerged as the core state of the world capitalist system. As early as 1940 US economic and political elites forecast a vast revolution in the balance of power: the US would “become the heir and residuary legatee and receiver for the economic and political assets of the British Empire – the sceptre passes to the United States” (8).
A year later Henry R Luce announced the coming American Century: “America’s first century as a dominant power in the world” meant that its people would have “to accept wholeheartedly our duty and our opportunity as the most powerful and vital nation and exert upon the world the full impact of our influence as we see fit and by such means as we see fit”. He added that “in any sort of partnership with the British Empire, America should assume the role of senior partner” (9). By the mid 1940s the contours of the American Century had already emerged: US economic predominance and strategic supremacy upheld by a planetary network of military bases from the Arctic to the Cape and from the Atlantic to the Pacific.
The post-war US leaders who presided over the construction of the national security state were filled, in William Appleman Williams’s words, with “visions of omnipotence” (10): the US enjoyed enormous economic advantages, a significant technological edge and briefly held an atomic monopoly. Though the Korean stalemate (1953) and the Soviet Union’s nuclear weapons and missile programmes dented US self-confidence, it took defeat in Vietnam and the domestic social upheavals that accompanied the war to reveal the limits of power. Henry Kissinger’s and Richard Nixon’s “realism in an era of decline” was a reluctant acknowledgement that the overarching hegemony of the previous 20 years could not and would not last forever.
But Vietnam and the Nixon era were a turning point in another more paradoxical way: domestically they ushered in the conservative revolution and the concerted effort of the mid-1980s to restore and renew the national security state and US world power. When the Soviet Union collapsed a few years later, misguided visions of omnipotence resurfaced. Conservative triumphalists dreamed of primacy and sought to lock in long-term unipolarity (11). Iraq was a strategic experiment designed to begin the Second American Century. That experiment and US foreign policy now lie in ruins.
Britain’s long exit
Historical analogies are never perfect but Great Britain’s long exit from empire may shed some light on the present moment. At the end of the 19th century few British leaders could begin to imagine an end to empire. When Queen Victoria’s Diamond Jubilee was celebrated in 1897, Britain possessed a formal transoceanic empire that encompassed a quarter of the world’s territory and 300 million subalterns and subjects – twice that if China, a near colony of 430 million people, was included. The City of London was the centre of an even more far-flung informal trading and financial empire that bound the world. It is unsurprising that, despite apprehensions over US and German industrial competitiveness, significant parts of the British elite believed that they had been given “a gift from the Almighty of a lease of the universe for ever”.
The Jubilee turned out to be “final sunburst of an unalloyed belief in British fitness to rule” (12). The second Boer war (1899-1902) fought to preserve the routes to India and secure the weakest link in the imperial chain, wasted British wealth and blood and revealed the atrocities of scorched-earth policies to a restive British public. “The South African War was the greatest test of British imperial power since the Indian Mutiny and turned into the most extensive and costly war fought by Britain between the defeat of Napoleon and the First World War” (13). The war that broke out in 1914 bankrupted and exhausted its European protagonists. The long end of the British era had started. However, the empire not only survived the immediate crisis but hobbled on for decades, through the second world war, until its inglorious end at Suez in 1956. Still, a nostalgia for lost grandeur persists. As Tony Blair’s Mesopotamian adventures show, the imperial afterglow has faded but is not entirely extinguished.
For the US power elite, being on top of the world has been a habit for 60 years. Hegemony has been a way of life; empire, a state of being and of mind. The institutional realist critics of the Bush administration have no alternative conceptual framework for international relations, based on something other than force, the balance of power or strategic predominance. The present crisis and the deepening impact of global concerns will perhaps generate new impulses for cooperation and interdependence in future. Yet it is just as likely that US policy will be unpredictable: as all post-colonial experiences show, de-imperialisation is likely to be a long and possibly traumatic process.
The ‘American Century’ only began 60 years ago. But it seems already to be over, with the disaster of Iraq forcing some of the United States’ ruling elites to realise that its hegemony has been severely weakened. But nobody seems to know what to do next, or even how to behave
By Philip S Golub
The disastrous outcome of the invasion and occupation of Iraq has caused a crisis in the power elite of the United States deeper than that resulting from defeat in Vietnam 30 years ago. Ironically, it is the very coalition of ultra-nationalists and neo-conservatives that coalesced in the 1970s, seeking to reverse the Vietnam syndrome, restore US power and revive “the will to victory”, that has caused the present crisis.
There has been no sustained popular mass protest as there was during the Vietnam war, probably because of the underclass sociology of the US’s volunteer army and the fact that the war is being funded by foreign financial flows (although no one knows how long that can continue). However, at the elite level the war has fractured the national security establishment that has run the US for six decades. The unprecedented public critique in 2006 by several retired senior officers over the conduct of the war (1), plus recurrent signs of dissent in the intelligence agencies and the State Department, reflects a much wider trend in elite opinion and key state institutions.
Not all critics are as forthright as retired General William Odom, who tirelessly repeats that the invasion of Iraq was the “greatest strategic disaster in United States history” (2), or Colonel Larry Wilkerson, Colin Powell’s former chief of staff, who denounced a “blunder of historic proportions” and has recently suggested impeaching the president (3), or former National Security Council head Zbigniew Brzezinski who called the war and occupation a “historic, strategic and moral calamity” (4).
Most public critiques from within the institutions of state focus on the way the war and occupation have been mismanaged rather than the more fundamental issue of the invasion itself. Yet discord is wide and deep: government departments are trading blame, accusing each other of the “loss of Iraq” (5). In private, former senior officials express incandescent anger, denounce shadowy cabals and have deep contempt for the White House. A former official of the National Security Council compared the president and his staff to the Corleone mafia family in The Godfather. A senior foreign policy expert said: “Due to an incompetent, arrogant and corrupt clique we are about to lose our hegemonic position in the Middle East and Gulf.” “The White House has broken the army and trampled its honour,” added a Republican senator and former Vietnam veteran.
No doves
None of these, nor any of the other institutional critics, could be considered doves: whatever their political affiliations (mostly Republican) or personal beliefs, they were – and some are still – guardians of US power, managers of the national security state, and sometimes central actors in covert and overt imperial interventions in the third world during the cold war and post-cold war. They were – and some are still – system managers of a self-perpetuating bureaucratic national security machine – first analysed by the sociologist C Wright Mills – whose function is the production and reproduction of power.
As a social group, these realists cannot be distinguished from the object of their criticism in terms of their willingness to use force or their historically demonstrated ruthlessness in achieving state aims. Nor can the cause of their dissent be attributed to conflicting convictions over ethics, norms and values (though this may be a motivating factor for some). It lies rather in the rational realisation that the war in Iraq has nearly “broken the US army” (6), weakened the national security state, and severely if not irreparably undermined “America’s global legitimacy” (7) – its ability to shape world preferences and set the global agenda. The most sophisticated expressions of dissent, such as Brzezinski’s, reflect the understanding that power is not reducible to the ability to coerce, and that, once lost, hegemonic legitimacy is hard to restore.
The signs of slippage are everywhere apparent: in Latin America, where US influence is at its lowest in decades; in East Asia, where the US has been obliged, reluctantly, to negotiate with North Korea and recognise China as an indispensable actor in regional security; in Europe, where US plans to install missile defence capabilities in Poland are being contested by Germany and other European Union states; in the Gulf, where longstanding allies such as Saudi Arabia are pursuing autonomous agendas that coincide only in part with US aims; and in the international institutions, the UN and the World Bank, where the US is no longer in a position to drive the agenda unaided.
Transnational opinion surveys show a consistent and nearly global pattern of defiance of US foreign policy as well as a more fundamental erosion in the attractiveness of the US: the narrative of the American dream has been submerged by images of a military leviathan disregarding world opinion and breaking the rules. World public opinion may not stop wars but it does count in subtler ways. Some of this slippage may be repairable under new leaders and with new and less aggressive policies. Yet it is hard to see how internal unity of purpose will be restored: it took decades to rebuild the shaken US armed forces after Vietnam and to define an elite and popular consensus on the uses of power. The mobilisation of nationalist sentiment to support foreign adventures will not be so easy after Iraq. Nor can one imagine a return to the status quo in world politics.
The invasion and occupation of Iraq is not the sole cause of the trends sketched. Rather, the war significantly accentuated all of them at a moment when larger centrifugal forces were already at work: the erosion and collapse of the Washington Consensus and the gradual rise of new gravitational centres, notably in Asia, were established trends when President George Bush went to war. Now, as the shift in the world economy towards Asia matures, the US is stuck in a conflict that is absorbing its total energies. History is moving on and the world is slipping, slowly but inexorably, out of US hands.
Destined to act as hegemon
For the US power elite this is deeply unsettling. Since the mid-20th century US leaders have thought of themselves as having a unique historic responsibility to lead and govern the globe. Sitting on top of the world since the 1940s, they have assumed that, like Great Britain in the 19th century, they were destined to act as hegemon – a dominant state having the will and the means to establish and maintain international order: peace and an open and expanding liberal world economy. In their reading of history it was Britain’s inability to sustain such a role and the US’s simultaneous unwillingness to take responsibility (isolationism) that created the conditions for the cycle of world wars and depression during the first half of the 20th century.
The corollary of this assumption is the circular argument that since order requires a dominant centre, the maintenance of order (or avoidance of chaos) requires the perpetuation of hegemony. This belief system, theorised in US academia in the 1970s as “hegemonic stability”, has underpinned US foreign policy since the second world war, when the US emerged as the core state of the world capitalist system. As early as 1940 US economic and political elites forecast a vast revolution in the balance of power: the US would “become the heir and residuary legatee and receiver for the economic and political assets of the British Empire – the sceptre passes to the United States” (8).
A year later Henry R Luce announced the coming American Century: “America’s first century as a dominant power in the world” meant that its people would have “to accept wholeheartedly our duty and our opportunity as the most powerful and vital nation and exert upon the world the full impact of our influence as we see fit and by such means as we see fit”. He added that “in any sort of partnership with the British Empire, America should assume the role of senior partner” (9). By the mid 1940s the contours of the American Century had already emerged: US economic predominance and strategic supremacy upheld by a planetary network of military bases from the Arctic to the Cape and from the Atlantic to the Pacific.
The post-war US leaders who presided over the construction of the national security state were filled, in William Appleman Williams’s words, with “visions of omnipotence” (10): the US enjoyed enormous economic advantages, a significant technological edge and briefly held an atomic monopoly. Though the Korean stalemate (1953) and the Soviet Union’s nuclear weapons and missile programmes dented US self-confidence, it took defeat in Vietnam and the domestic social upheavals that accompanied the war to reveal the limits of power. Henry Kissinger’s and Richard Nixon’s “realism in an era of decline” was a reluctant acknowledgement that the overarching hegemony of the previous 20 years could not and would not last forever.
But Vietnam and the Nixon era were a turning point in another more paradoxical way: domestically they ushered in the conservative revolution and the concerted effort of the mid-1980s to restore and renew the national security state and US world power. When the Soviet Union collapsed a few years later, misguided visions of omnipotence resurfaced. Conservative triumphalists dreamed of primacy and sought to lock in long-term unipolarity (11). Iraq was a strategic experiment designed to begin the Second American Century. That experiment and US foreign policy now lie in ruins.
Britain’s long exit
Historical analogies are never perfect but Great Britain’s long exit from empire may shed some light on the present moment. At the end of the 19th century few British leaders could begin to imagine an end to empire. When Queen Victoria’s Diamond Jubilee was celebrated in 1897, Britain possessed a formal transoceanic empire that encompassed a quarter of the world’s territory and 300 million subalterns and subjects – twice that if China, a near colony of 430 million people, was included. The City of London was the centre of an even more far-flung informal trading and financial empire that bound the world. It is unsurprising that, despite apprehensions over US and German industrial competitiveness, significant parts of the British elite believed that they had been given “a gift from the Almighty of a lease of the universe for ever”.
The Jubilee turned out to be “final sunburst of an unalloyed belief in British fitness to rule” (12). The second Boer war (1899-1902) fought to preserve the routes to India and secure the weakest link in the imperial chain, wasted British wealth and blood and revealed the atrocities of scorched-earth policies to a restive British public. “The South African War was the greatest test of British imperial power since the Indian Mutiny and turned into the most extensive and costly war fought by Britain between the defeat of Napoleon and the First World War” (13). The war that broke out in 1914 bankrupted and exhausted its European protagonists. The long end of the British era had started. However, the empire not only survived the immediate crisis but hobbled on for decades, through the second world war, until its inglorious end at Suez in 1956. Still, a nostalgia for lost grandeur persists. As Tony Blair’s Mesopotamian adventures show, the imperial afterglow has faded but is not entirely extinguished.
For the US power elite, being on top of the world has been a habit for 60 years. Hegemony has been a way of life; empire, a state of being and of mind. The institutional realist critics of the Bush administration have no alternative conceptual framework for international relations, based on something other than force, the balance of power or strategic predominance. The present crisis and the deepening impact of global concerns will perhaps generate new impulses for cooperation and interdependence in future. Yet it is just as likely that US policy will be unpredictable: as all post-colonial experiences show, de-imperialisation is likely to be a long and possibly traumatic process.
19/10/2007
The Clash of Civilizations?", 'X' article of the post-Cold War
The Clash of Civilizations?", 'X' article of the post-Cold War
The 'Clash of Civilizations': Revisited after September 11
Engin I. Erdem*
The dissolution of the Soviet Union not only ended the Cold War era
but also it terminated simplistic understanding of world politics,
which was dominant during this time. The bloc mentality of the Cold
War has no longer provided an outlook to delineate the picture of the
new period. By the end of the Cold War, henceforth, students of
international relations have witnessed several 'contending images of
world politics'(1). The images are basically concerned with redefining
the newly emerging world politics. Interestingly, all of these images
originate in the West and in the United States in particular.(2) The
linkage is in fact significant as it demonstrates knowledge-power
relationship in international relations. Of these 'western' images of
world politics, especially Francis Fukayama's the 'End of History'(3)
and Samuel P. Huntington's the 'Clash of Civilizations?' have earned
utmost attention. In contrast to Fukayama's optimistic vision of
future, Huntington has called forth World War III that stems from
clash of civilizations.(4) He predicts that 'fundamental' differences
among the seven or eight major civilizations will more likely pave way
to global turmoil in years to come.
This paper, aims at revisiting the 'clash of civilizations' thesis in
post-September 11 world, is consisted of six parts. After introductory
section, second section will deal with Huntington's arguments, which
take place in his article, book, and his respond to the criticisms. In
the third part, seven categories of criticisms on Huntington's thesis
will take place. Then, the thesis will be re-examined in aftermath of
September 11. The fifth section will briefly touch upon Islam-the West
relations. Finally, there will be a concluding part, which offers
several remarks about the clash thesis and the delicate nature of
Islam-the West relations in the new epoch of world politics after
September 11.
INTRODUCTION
George F. Kennan's 'X' article in Foreign Affairs of July 1947(5) not
only pioneered the U.S policy of containment during the Cold War but
also the article overwhelmingly framed the agenda of international
relations (IR) and U.S foreign policy thereafter. 'X' article later
became one of the most cited studies in the field of international
relations. In similar to Kennan's article, Harvard professor of
political science, Samuel P. Huntington's 'The Clash of
Civilizations?' article, which published in Foreign Affairs of Summer
1993 has significantly shaped the post-Cold War discourse(s) of IR and
U.S foreign policy. Proponents of the civilizational clash thesis and
its critics afterward have created a 'clash of scholarship'(6) in the
field. The clash of scholarship indeed has primarily induced 'fruitful
debates'(7), and it has brought the following questions into the
forefront of disciplinary agenda.
What is the nature of the newly emerging international system in
aftermath of the end of the Cold War? Which theory, paradigm or model
of IR does have the most descriptive, explanatory, prescriptive and
predictive power(8) to portray the post-Cold War world politics?
What causes to international conflict and war? Do either a clash of
'national interests' or divergent values, ideas, cultures, identities,
and civilizations primarily lead to conflict at both regional and
global levels?
How should the U.S foreign policy be re-formulated according to the
changing nature of world politics by the end of the Cold War? How
should the United States re-define its 'national interests' and
re-assess its 'strategic priorities'?
How the West-Islam relations are going to be developed in the new era
of global politics? Does/Should the United States, who is the world's
only superpower of the new era have a policy towards Islam/the Muslim
World, if yes and, how should the U.S have a policy? What is the
likely future of Islam-the West relations; conflictual or cooperative?
Does Islam compatible with democracy? Should the U.S continue to
support autocratic/authoritarian regimes in the Muslim Middle East in
order to pursue its 'strategic' interests or should the United States
reconsider and even change the policy?
While Samuel P. Huntington's the 'Clash of Civilizations?" thesis has
directed substantial attention to these questions, the critics of
Huntington have also extended the discussion further. The debate, on
the other hand, has come back into world agenda in the aftermath of
September 11 attacks.
The September 11, which is the single most remarkable event after the
Cold War, no doubt has created numerous expectations about the
changing nature of post-Cold War international system and global
politics. Ironically, it has demonstrated that how the world's only
superpower is not immune from the dangers and fragility of current
international system. On the other hand, the September 11 has
seriously questioned patterns of U.S foreign policy and especially its
policy towards the Middle East. Not surprisingly, Samuel P.
Huntington's clash of civilizations thesis has frequently taken place
in post-September 11 debates. Henceforth, fourth part of the paper
will be about the clash thesis in connection with the 9/11. Prior to
Huntington's critiques and the September 11, however, one should first
look at essentials of the clash of civilizations thesis, which take
place in the ensuing section.
WALKING THROUGH HUNTINGTONIAN WORLD
Well before Huntington's 'the Clash of Civilizations?' article in
Foreign Affairs of Summer 1993, Bernard Lewis, well-known historian
and scholar of Princeton University, talked about the 'clash' in
September 1990 as follow.
It should by now clear that we are facing a mood and a movement far
transcending the level of issues and policies and the governments that
pursue them. This is no less than a clash of civilizations the perhaps
irrational but surely historic reaction of an ancient rival against
our Judeo-Christian heritage, our secular present, and the worldwide
expansion of both. It is crucially important that we on our side
should not be provoked into an equally historic but equally irrational
reaction against that rival.(9)
Three years after Bernard Lewis's Atlantic Monthly article, Samuel P.
Huntington came with a similar argument. In the first page of his
famous article, Huntington presented his civilizational conflict
paradigm;
It is my hypothesis that the fundamental source of conflict in this
new world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The
great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict
will be cultural. Nation states will remain the most powerful actors
in world affairs, but the principal conflicts of global politics will
occur between nations and groups of different civilizations. The clash
of civilizations will dominate global politics. The fault lines
between civilizations will be battle lines of the future.(10)
Huntington's clash of civilizations thesis first of all endeavors to
offer a new paradigm of world politics. Hence, it is basically about
international relations theory. In contrast to state-centric realist
theory and system-dominated neo-realist model, Huntington primarily
focuses on cultural-religious-civilizational factors. He calls forth a
paradigmatic shift to understand the post-Cold War global politics. He
argues that his 'civilizational conflict paradigm' is superior to the
alternative models, which have been developed after the Cold War.
Since inter-civilizational issues are replacing inter-superpower ones
in the new era, he argues, his paradigm provides better than any
alternative.(11)
Huntington asserts that civilizational differences, which stem from
divergent cultural and religious values will be primary causes of
regional and global conflicts in the post-Cold War epoch. The clash of
civilizations is inevitable though not necessarily to be violent. The
fault lines between civilizations stem from differences in social and
political values. Civilizations, Huntington says, have 'different
values on the relations between God and man, the individual and group,
the citizen and state, parents and children, husband and wife, as well
as differing views of the relative importance of rights and
responsibilities, liberty and authority, equality and
hierarchy'.(12)seven or eight major civilizations, he claims,
especially Islamic and Western civilizations have more likely to be
clashed because Islam is the only civilization that aspires
universalist values and poses a significant challenge to the West. On
the other hand, Huntington talks about an Islamic-Confucian connection
against the Western civilization. In doing so, he recommends that the
West should limit expansion of Islamic-Confucian states' military and
economic power and the West should exploit differences between the two
civilizations.
Besides, Huntington is highly concerned with de-Westernization and
indigenization of elites as well as non-Western modernization in many
non-Western countries. The West and the United States especially,
Huntington argues, should be cautious about this development. In this
regard, the West should control immigration and assimilate immigrants
in order to preserve and reify civilizational homogeneity. As he
extensively concerns with the status of Western power and unity,
Huntington also calls for improvement of Western unity. In this
respect, he recommends empowerment of the Atlantic partnership between
the US and Europe. In order to realize civilizational homogeneity of
the West he attributes NATO a 'civilizational mission'(13) Then, he
recommends that Turkey and Greece should be out of NATO for the
purpose of West's civilizational coherence.(14)
Huntington argues that the rest can hardly copy the West since he West
is not universal but unique. For this reason, the West should not
aspire universalism. Otherwise, it will lead to resentment in
non-Western world since universalism is perceived as imperialism by
the rest.(15). In the words of Huntington;
Western universalism is dangerous to the world because it could lead
to a major intercivilizational war between core states and it is
dangerous to the West…Multiculturalism at home threatens the US and
the West; universalism abroad threatens the West and the world, both
deny the uniqueness of Western culture(16)
Moreover, Huntington favors Americanization and denounces
multiculturalism. He criticizes multiculturalist tendencies in the
United States since it weakens the 'American creed'(17). 'A
multicivilizational United States will not be the US, it will be the
UN'(18). The anti-multiculturalist standing, however, has far-reaching
implications for minority groups including the Muslims in the United
States.
Finally, one of the most interesting and remarkable parts of
Huntington's clash thesis is that his presentation of several policy
recommendations. These advices are primarily related to American
politics and US foreign policy. Of especially critical importance, the
recommendations as follow;
For Domestic Politics
Tightening immigration and assimilating immigrants and minorities in
order to increase the civilizational coherence. Otherwise the US would
be a 'cleft country'.
Instead multiculturalism pursuing policy of Americanization
For the US Foreign and Security Policy
Maintaining Western technological and military superiority over other
civilizations.
Enhancing the Western unity by means of pursuing Atlanticist policy.
Hence, the US should empower trans-Atlantic cooperation
Limiting the expansion of Islamic-Confucian states' military and
economic power and exploiting differences between these states.
Avoiding universalist aspiration since the West is unique not
universalist. Not to intervene in the affairs of other civilizations.
In case of a World War III, which civilizational differences are high
likely to cause the United States should get Japan, Latin American
states and Russia in her side against potential Islamic-Confucian
cooperation.(19)
These policy recommendations, which are tremendously provocative, have
generated great amount of attention in both the United States/West and
the rest of the world. Henceforth, it has drawn several criticisms.
Critiques to Huntington's policy recommendations as well as other
criticisms of the clash thesis will take place in the following
section.
BEYOND HUNTINGTONIAN WORLD
Not surprisingly, Samuel P. Huntington's 'thought-provoking' and/or
provocative the 'Clash of Civilizations?' essay has attracted
voluminous attention in all over the world and it has resulted in a
'clash of scholarship'(20). Though the thesis touches upon rich array
of issues, international relations theory, the U.S foreign policy and
Islam-the West/Islam-democracy relations have become the major areas
of contention. In this section, the paper incorporates major
criticisms of Huntington's civilizational clash thesis. In doing so,
seven types of criticisms deserve the most attention.
First of all, Huntington has been criticized for his presentation of
'new paradigm'. He argues that the dominant Cold War paradigm of
state-centric realist model can no longer be useful to understand the
post-Cold War era and claims that civilizational differences will be
primary source of regional and global conflicts.(21) The critics
suggest that Huntington's 'civilizational conflict paradigm' is
reductionist and deterministic since there are multiple causes of
conflict, in which civilizational factors do not play significant
role.(22) In opposed to Huntington, many also have argued that 'clash
of interests' rather than 'clash of civilizations' will continue to be
real cause of conflict.(23) For instance, Shireen T. Hunter argues
that problematic relations between the West and the Muslim World are
hardly stemmed from civilizational differences as Huntington argues
but from structural-political and economic- inequalities between the
two worlds of 'have' and 'have nots'.(24) On the other hand, Fouad
Ajami contends that Huntington overestimates cultural differences
between civilizations while he underestimates the influence of the
West in the hostile relations with the Muslim World.(25) The critics
argue that Huntington does not come up with a 'new paradigm' since his
thesis fits into 'political realism' par excellence(26). They contend
that Huntington follows bloc based Cold War mentality while he is
basically concerned with the West's technological and military
superiority.(27) They also suggest that Huntington's 'Machivellian'
advice of exploiting differences between Islamic and Confucian
civilizations can only be considered within the 'realist' realm.(28)
On the other hand, G. John Ikenberry argues that Huntington calls
forth a new Cold War. In similar to Ikenberry, Rubenstein and Crocker
assert that Huntington proclaims; 'long live the new Cold War'.(29) In
sum, Huntington has received several criticisms on the basis of his
'new paradigm'.
Second category of criticisms is about Huntington's 'monolithic'
conception of civilizations and ignorance of intra-civilizational
differences and domestic conflict. Many critics argue that Huntington
has monolithic conception of the 'West' and 'Islam', in which
polycentric structure of both worlds has been totally neglected.(30)
On one side, there is a serious contention of multiculturalism vs.
Americanization in the U.S, which James Kurth labels it as the 'real
clash'.(31) Kurth argues that the idea of West has undergone a
significant transformation in turn of the 21st century, and the real
clash will happen not between the West and the rest, as Huntington
assumes, but it will arise between pro-Western conservatives and
post-Western liberal multiculturalists in the U.S/West.(32) On the
other side, the critics contend that Huntington ignores internal
dynamics, plurality and 'myriad complexities'(33) of Islam/the Muslim
World.(34) They argue that there is no single Islamic culture as
Huntington implies but there are multiple centers of Islam and various
types of political Islam and Islamism in the Muslim World.(35) For
this reason, some critics call for 'de-constructing monolithic
perceptions' of Islam and the West.(36) Furthermore, there are
numerous conflicts within civilizations. For instance, M.E Ahrari and
S. Hunter ask Huntington how Iraqi and Turkish treatment of Kurds can
demonstrate civilizational unity and coherence.(37) Besides, it may
happen more cooperation between two countries that come from different
civilizations than those of the same civilization. Hunter gives the
example of Turkey's strategic relations with Israel in the 1990s when
a time its relations with the Arab World and Iran were generally
problematic.(38) In sum, second sort of criticisms focuses on
diversity and dynamics of each civilization and intra-civilizational
differences/domestic conflict. To these critics, neither the West nor
other civilizations is monolithic and domestic
conflicts/intra-civilizational differences matter more than
civilizational conflicts.
Third, Huntington has pulled many criticisms because of the alleged
inconsistencies, methodological flaws, and overgeneralizations in his
thesis as well as for his reading of history and 'selective
perception'.(39) For instance, Robert Marks argues that Huntington
mostly uses secondary sources in his book and he has weak scholarship
of Islam, China and Japan.(40) Marks also suggest that Huntington's
theory is methodologically flawed because of his frequent
overgeneralizations in the analysis of civilizations. On the other
hand, many argue that Huntington's thesis has several inconsistencies.
For example, he mentions both 'Arab' and 'Islamic' civilizations.(41)
Moreover, many have also criticized the cases, which Huntington uses
to support his thesis. Fouad Ajami, for instance, contends that the
Gulf War is a case for 'clash of state interests' par excellence not a
case for 'clash of civilizations'.(42) Interestingly, Huntington
upholds his thesis with King Hussein of Jordan, which he said the war
happens between the West and Islam.(43) However, Huntington probably
should know that the coalition that formed against Saddam Hussein was
composed of several Muslim states including Turkey and Saudi Arabia.
In similar to Ajami's criticism of the Gulf War case, Hunter
criticizes Huntington's use of Armenian-Azerbaijan conflict as
civilizational clash since she argues that Muslim Iran had more
friendly relations with 'Christian' Armenians than 'Muslim'
Azerbaijan.(44) Furthermore, Seizaburo Sato asks Huntington why he
suggests getting Japan against potential Islamic-Confucian alignment
while he earlier defined Japan as economic threat to the West. Sato
also questions Huntington's advice to get Russia into the EU since he
also puts Russia as the core state of Slavic-Orthodox
civilization.(45) In this respect, the critics have focused on vast
generalizations and 'inconsistencies'.
Fourth, the clash of civilizations thesis has attracted considerable
amount of criticism on the basis of its language of 'us' and 'them' or
its embedded epistemology of 'othering'.(46) The critics generally
hold that Huntington's understanding of Islam-the West relations is
fundamentally based upon orientalist scholarship of Islam, in which
Islam is perceived as a problem and even a threat to the West.(47)
Edward Said, a well-known critic of orientalism, contends that
Huntington's thesis has orientalist backdrop, hence it always
privileges the West and ignores the other (Islam). For Said, this
approach is less likely to lead any critical understanding of 'other'
but it only feeds self-pride. He also argues that there is a 'clash of
ignorance' rather than 'clash of civilizations'.(48) On the other
hand, Manochehr Dorraj, argues that the clash thesis reifies,
distorts, and de-humanizes the Muslims.(49) Finally, the critics argue
that perceiving the 'other' as a 'threat' instead a 'challenge'(50),
leads to 'siege mentality', which originate from 'Western hubris'.(51)
Fifth category of criticisms is about Huntington's policy
recommendations on the basis of his interpretation of post-Cold War
global politics. The critics, first of all, questions Huntington's
'enemy' discourse, in which Islamic and Confucian civilizations are
perceived as a threat to the West. Monshipouri, Petonito and
Battistella contend that Huntington looks for new enemies, which
replace the adversary of the Cold War, the Soviet Union.(52) Said and
Wasim, on the other hand, argue that Huntington's theory is an
ideological and strategic theory that aims at influencing the US
foreign and defense policy.(53) In this regard, Hans Kung pinpoints
the fact that Huntington was an advisor to Pentagon in 1994 while his
thesis has become so popular in all over the world. Kung also suggests
that Huntington's scenario of World War III that stems from clash of
civilizations interestingly fits best into military and
representatives of arms industry.(54) In this respect, the 'clash of
civilizations' is considered as 'purposeful thesis' as it aims at
guiding the US foreign and security policy. Moreover, some scholars
criticize Huntington's advice to pursue 'Atlanticist policy', by
increasing the relations with Europe against 'Islamic-Confucian
connection'. According to John Ikenberry, Huntington's vision
originates from bloc mentality and his approach is significantly
dangerous for the United States and international peace. In sum,
Huntington has taken many criticisms for the policy recommendations.
Sixth, as stated above, the 'Clash of Civilizations?' article has
produced 'fruitful debates' within the discipline of international
relations. Then the discipline has witnessed several empirical studies
about the thesis. These studies constitute the sixth type of
critiques. Of these empirical studies, Pippa Norris and Ronald
Inglehart's study is especially remarkable. They have compared
political and social values of the Western and Muslim societies by
using World Values Survey database. Norris and Inglehart,
'surprisingly', have found that Muslims have no less democratic ideals
than the West and 'the West is not distinctive to Islam in its faith
in democracy'.(55) In this respect, their study has considerably
falsified Huntington's assumption that Islam and the West have
fundamentally different political values based upon predominant
religious cultures. The study demonstrates the existence of similar
political attitudes in the Muslim World and the West. Manus
Midlarsky's empirical study has also produced a similar conclusion
that there is no negative association between Islam and democracy,
which Huntington assumes to lead civilizational conflict.(56)
Moreover, Bruce Russett, John Oneal and Michaelene Cox have looked for
the significance of cultural/civilizational variables in causing
international conflict. Their study is based on University of
Michigan's Correlates of War Project, which keeps data of all
militarized inter-state disputes from 1885 to 1994. They have finally
found that realist and liberal variables of conflict (realist
variables-geography, power, alliances and liberal variables-democracy,
economic interdependence and international organizations) not
civilizations matter most in international conflict and
cooperation.(57) Hence, all these three empirical studies pose
significant challenge to the clash of civilizations thesis.
Last but not least, Samuel Huntington's thesis has been harshly
criticized as claiming that the 'clash of civilizations' will likely
to be a 'self-fulfilling prophecy'. It means that Huntington's thesis
causes the expected event-clash of civilizations- to occur and so the
thesis confirms it own 'accuracy'. On the other hand, John Ikenberry
says that Huntington's thesis is civilizational equivalent of
'security dilemma', in which misperceptions about the other eventually
increases the tension and then leads to conflict(58). He also suggests
'if ideas by prominent thinkers have any impact on the real world' the
clash thesis is potentially dangerous.(59) On the other hand, both
Mahbubani and Sato contend that Huntington's policy recommendations,
if applied, will be so dangerous and they will cause a disaster for
international peace and security.(60) Furthermore, many have
criticized Huntington for his pessimistic vision of future and
ignorance the fact that cooperation and dialogue among civilizations
are possible. For this reason, it is not coincidence that several
conferences on civilizational dialogue have been organized recently,
probably as a response to the 'clash of civilizations'.(61)
The seven types of criticisms, which are mentioned above constitute a
substantial challenge to Samuel Huntington's thesis. Huntington
responded some of these critiques in his "If Not Civilizations,
What?:Paradigms of the Post-Cold War World" article in Foreign Affairs
of November/December 1993 and his 'Clash of Civilizations" book. The
debate has however continued thereafter. Finally, the September 11 has
greatly influenced the debate. The following section will deal with
the issue especially focusing on the question; how the debate will
likely to make a sense for the post-9/11 world politics?
A CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS IN POST-SEPTEMBER 11 WORLD?
To what extent the September 11 has influenced the debate for the
'clash of civilizations'. Is the post-September 11 world fitting more
to Huntington's frame? How Huntington has revisited or even
'falsified' the thesis by his own article in Newsweek of December
2001? These are interesting questions come into mind. This section
will mainly deal with these questions. Yet, one should first look at
major developments that happened after the tragic events of September
11.
First of all, Islam-the West relations have gained an increasing
attention after September 11. Even though many in the West have
rightly reiterated that Islam is religion of peace(62) and Al-Quida
cannot be considered as representative of Islam, Islam vs. terror
debate has frequently come into agenda.(63) Not unexpectedly, the
Western media looked at 'Islamic roots' of the terrible attacks.
Thereafter, 'Islam', 'Islamism', 'political Islam' and 'Islamic
fundamentalism' became the most frequently used terms in the media.
Not surprisingly, the 'clash of civilizations' has also extensively
taken place in this time.
Second, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict has overwhelmingly topped
into regional and global agenda as a result of increasing tension in
the region. The conflict has accelerated the debate for 'clash of
civilizations', asking the question; to what extent the conflict can
be considered within the realm of clash of civilizations?
Third, anti-Americanism has significantly increased in the Muslim
World in aftermath of the September 11. According to the recent Gallup
poll, there is considerable distrust of the United States after
September 11.(64) This is also other important development that
increased interest over the clash thesis.
Does post-September 11 world really fit into to the clash thesis? The
answer seems to be no because of the following reasons. First, the
United States led- campaign in Afghanistan has acquired significant
support from the Muslim World. Even Iran has supported the U.S led
campaign and Turkey has played an active role in the campaign(65) One
may talk about global coalition against terrorism, which across
different civilizations. The growing anti-American sentiments,
however, is not limited to the Muslim World since it is a fact in
elsewhere including 'Western' Europe.(66) The growing anti-Americanism
is in fact not about civilizational values but primarily about the
U.S's Mideast policy. The United States is criticized especially for
its alleged unbalanced, pro-Israeli policy in the Palestinian-Israeli
conflict and because of its cooperation with authoritarian-repressive
regimes of the Middle East.(67) Anti-Americanism is, on the other
hand, especially very related to the Bush administration. The
administration's 'axis of evil' rhetoric has attracted serious
criticisms not only from the Muslim world but also from Europe.(68)
Furthermore, US hegemony and unilateralism not 'Western-Christian-
values can be considered as cause of growing anti-American sentiments
in the Muslim world. In this respect, ignoring the different political
perspectives within the 'Western' civilization and talking about
'clash of civilizations' is considerably questionable.
In revisiting the clash thesis after September 11, it is noteworthy
mentioning about Huntington's 'The Age of Muslim Wars' article in
Newsweek of December 2001. Though Huntington argues here that 'the
makings exist for a clash of civilizations between Muslim and
non-Muslims and he also argues that reactions to September 11 and the
American response were strictly along civilizational lines'(69) he
makes fundamental revisions in his earlier standing, which take place
in his 'Clash of Civilizations?' article and book. First of all,
Huntington now begins to argue that civilizational conflict is
possible but not inevitable while he had earlier said it is
inevitable. Second, he now maintains that 'the age of Muslim wars has
roots in more general causes that do not include the inherent nature
of Islamic doctrine or beliefs. The clash of contemporary Muslim wars
lies in politics not 7th religious doctrines'. In this regard, he
refutes his earlier point that ontological differences of the Western
and Islamic civilizations-without talking about political factors-
inevitably produce the clash. Third, Huntington now underscores the
fact that the Muslim people reacts to the Western governments as they
support 'corrupt, ineffective, and repressive' governments. Fourth,
interestingly Huntington now recommends that hostility towards the
West could be reduced by changes in US policy toward Israel. In doing
so, he accepts the difference between the clash of civilizations,
which based upon divergent ontological worlds and anxiety towards to
US policies. Fifth, he also now talks about probability of peaceful
-'clash of civilizations' free- world politics in the future. This
also constitutes a great contradiction with his previous standing. In
sum, Huntington's Newsweek article, 'the Age of Muslim Wars', deserves
great attention to reconsider the clash thesis after September 11.
A BRIEF NOTE ON ISLAM-THE WEST RELATIONS AFTER SEPTEMBER 11
The tragedy of September 11, not unexpectedly, deeply sensitized
Islam-the West relations and especially the U.S relations with the
Muslim World. Then, the following questions have become of critical
importance; how does the 'clash of civilizations' discourse make an
impact on the post-9/11 relations between the Muslim World and the
West/the U.S? How the event will influence perceptions of Islam and
the Muslims in the mind of Western elites and people? How will the
Muslims in the United States and Europe likely to be influenced by
post-September 11 developments?(70) These questions are obviously of
profound importance and they will most likely to be centerpiece of
numerous debates thereafter.
Samuel P. Huntington's clash of civilizations paradigm unquestionably
has menacing implications for Islam-the West relations.(71) As
mentioned earlier, Huntington's understanding of Islam basically bases
upon orientalist scholarship of Islam, in which Islam-'the other' is
being depicted as a threat and even an enemy to the West. It also
fosters and/or justifies negative images and stereotypes of
Islam/Muslims such as 'violent, terroristic, backward, and
immoral'.(72) The negative stereotypes eventually distract the West
from the search for critical understanding and dialogue with Islam/the
Muslim World. In this respect, Huntington's perspective of Islam is
considerably parallel to orientalist scholarship's story of conflict
rather than dialogue or at least peaceful coexistence between the two
worlds. Neo-third worldist or anti-orientalist scholarship of Islam,
on the other hand, portrays a different scheme of Islam-the West
relations. As pointed earlier, this scholarship deeply criticizes
orientalist 'epistemology of othering'(73) and the depiction of Islam
as a threat and enemy. It also has a different historical perspective
of Islam-the West relations. This scholarship emphasizes long periods
of peaceful coexistence between the two worlds. Moreover,
anti-orientalist scholars, such as John Esposito emphasize diversity
and plurality of the Muslim World by drawing attention towards various
'Islams', and 'Islamisms'.(74) Finally, they recommend that critical
understanding and dialogue between the two sides are of crucial
importance especially in the increasingly transnational and
interdependent world.(75)
The mentioned differences between orientalist and anti-orientalist
scholarship of Islam also appear in regard to divergent views of
'political Islam', 'Islamism' and 'Islamic fundamentalism'.(76)
Monolithic perceptions of orientalist perspective are also clear in
understanding of these phenomenons. This perspective generally depicts
those phenomenons as a great threat to 'Western civilization' as well
as to Western interests. On the other hand, anti-orientalist
perspective emphasizes the plurality and multi-dimensionality of
'political Islam', 'Islamism' and 'Islamic revivalism' by underscoring
various historical and political contexts within the Muslim World.
Moreover, the divergence between orientalist and anti-orientalist
scholarship of Islam also appears on Islam vs. democracy debate;
whether Islam and democracy is compatible. Expectedly, orientalist
scholarship underscores the inherent incompatibility while the other
side argues that Islam and democracy are compatible.(77)
The clash of civilizations thesis, no doubt, has considerably negative
implications for Islam-the West relations. First of all, it creates a
great setback for the West to recognize diversity and plurality of the
Muslim World and various interpretations of Islam. It closes all
avenues for dialogue with the 'other'. Moreover, it draws a very
pessimistic outlook for future of the relations, as Huntington
foresees, Islam and the West will inevitably clash though it may not
be violent.(78) Keeping Huntington's confrontational vision in mind,
the 9/11 might at first be seen as a case to validate the thesis. Yet,
the reality is hardly like that because of the two major reasons
First, American campaign against al-Quida terrorist organization has
received full support from the Muslim World including Iran, which has
the very hostile and problematic relations with the United States.
Yet, it does not necessarily mean that the whole Muslim World supports
the Bush administration's 'war against terrorism' and 'axis of evil'
discourse. The criticisms, however, are hardly related with
'civilizational differences' but they are mostly about the Bush
administration's unilateralism.(79) Besides, as mentioned above, these
criticisms are not restricted to the Muslim world.(80) European elites
and people have considerably criticized the Bush administration before
and after September 11 too.(81) In this respect, it is wrong to say
that American campaign against al-Quida and the growing anti-American
sentiments in the Muslim World after September 11 validates the clash
of civilizations thesis.
Second, the growing anti-Americanism in aftermath of September 11 is
also significantly dealt with the US policy towards the
Palestinian-Israeli conflict and its policy of supporting
authoritarian and repressive regimes for the sake of the 'strategic
interests'. As many- including Huntington(82)- argue that, the U.S may
alleviate the negative sentiments if she revises its policy toward the
region.(83) In this respect, the Muslim anxiety towards the United
States is deeply related to 'clash of policies-interests' not 'clash
of civilizations'. This also seems to be remained as a fact in
post-9/11 period.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
"The Clash of Civilizations?", 'X' article of the post-Cold War,
period has resulted in 'clash of scholarship' in both academic and
policy circles. This paper, first of all, endeavors to examine
Huntington's thesis and its critiques. Then, it briefly evaluates the
thesis in the post-September 11 world. In this final section, several
concluding remarks take place.
First of all, Harvard Professor, Samuel P. Huntington is right in the
sense that culture and religion considerably matter in aftermath of
the Cold War.(84) Cultural and religious elements not played
considerable role during the Cold War especially because of the strict
bipolar system in this time. The new era of global politics, on the
other hand, allows various ethnic, religious and cultural elements
come into forefront of regional and global politics. Numerous ethnic
conflicts and wars after the Cold War such as in Bosnia, Kosova,
Somalia, and Rwanda demonstrate the increasing importance of culture
and ethnicity. However, it does not mean that civilizational
differences, overlooking the struggles for power and interest, are
primary sources of conflict in this period. Besides, it is hard to
accept that Huntington's clash of civilizations model offers a 'new
paradigm'. Premises of classical realism- 'balance of power'
'interest' and 'alliances' essentially circumscribe the clash thesis.
Huntington deeply concerns with state of Western power vis-à-vis other
'civilizations' power'. (Remember, for example, his advice to empower
Atlantic partnership against 'Islamic-Confucian connection')
Second, Huntington's thesis basically depends on orientalist
understandings of Islam, in which Islam-the 'other'- is perceived as
culturally inferior to the West and identified as threat and even
enemy. This understanding ignores the diversity, plurality and various
dynamics of Islam/the Muslim World as well as that of 'Islamism' and
'Islamic fundamentalism'. This approach, however, closes the avenues
for mutual understanding and dialogue as well as it leads to 'clash of
misunderstandings'.(85) Moreover, Huntington has a selective
perception in choosing cases in order to enforce his argument. For
instance, he probably should know that the Gulf War is dealt with
'clash of interests', yet he exemplifies the War as a case for 'clash
of civilizations'. Furthermore, Huntington underestimates probability
of cooperation and dialogue among civilizations and between states,
which come from different civilizations. Besides, as one of the most
problematic points is that Huntington ignores the role of Western
colonialism and hegemony in Muslim anxiety towards the West. However,
as James Scott rightly suggests that 'wherever there is domination one
also finds resistance'(86).
Third, US action is very crucial for the future of Islam-the West
relations. As the world's only superpower, the United States should be
cautious about Muslim concerns in related to both Palestinian-Israeli
conflict and democratization process in the Middle East. The United
States encounters a dilemma in this regard; how it converges its
ideals of democracy and freedom with concerns of 'power and interest'.
The Muslim peoples have a conviction that the West/U.S pursues double
standards when democracy and human rights deal with the Muslim World.
The U.S should not enforce this belief in the Muslim World by ignoring
people's democratic demands for the sake of stability of its
"strategic interests'. As Henry Nau rightly proposes, the United
States should follow a coherent policy towards the Muslim Middle East
by converging his identity and power(87). Otherwise, the growing
anti-American sentiments in the Muslim World will continue to harm the
relations between the West/U.S and the Muslim World.
Fourth, the West and the Muslim World should be open to critical
dialogue and mutual understanding. The 'clash of civilizations'
discourse creates a great obstacle for this effort. The need for
dialogue between the two worlds in particular and among all
civilizations in general is especially clear in increasingly
transnational and interdependent world. Otherwise, the 'clash of
civilizations' would be self-fulfilling prophecy. To blame the other
and to abstain from self-criticisms does not produce a sustainable
solution for the problems between the two worlds. Dialogue and mutual
understanding is the only way for a promising future.
Fifth, as frequently stated above, the 'clash of civilizations' has
resulted in a 'clash of scholarship' in the fields of international
relations, American foreign and security policy as well as in dealing
with Islam-the West relations. In this respect, the clash thesis has
made important contribution in these areas. Lastly, the September 11
has vitalized the debate and sensitized the relations between the West
and the Muslim World. As asked earlier, the following questions have
become of profound importance; how does the 'clash of civilizations'
discourse make an impact on the post-9/11 relations between the Muslim
World and the West/the U.S? How the 9/11 will influence perceptions of
Islam and the Muslims in the mind of Western elites and people? How
will the Muslims in the United States and Europe likely to be
influenced by post-September 11 developments? This paper has only
touched upon these issues in brief; hence they urgently call for
further studies.
*Engin I. Erdem is PhD Student in Department of Politics at University
of Virginia.
ENDNOTES
(1)Greg Fry and Jacinta O'Hagan (Eds.), Contending Images of World
Politics, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2001)
(2)Fry and O'Hagan, "Introduction" in Contending Images of World
Politics, pp. 15-18
(3)Francis Fukayama, "The End of History", The National Interest,
No.16, Summer 1989 and The End of History and the Last Man (New York:
Avon Books, 1992)
(4)Samuel P. Huntington, "The West, Civilizations, and Civilization",
in The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New
York: Simon & Shuster 1996)
(5)X, "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," Foreign Affairs Vol.25, No. 4
(July 1947) (Reprinted in Foreign Affairs, Vol.65, No. 4 (Spring
1987), pp. 852-868
(6)Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart, "Islam and the West; Testing the
Clash of Civilizations Thesis", John F. Kennedy School of Government,
Harvard University, Faculty Research Working Papers Series
(RWP02-015), April 2002, p.14
(http://ksgnotes1.harvard.edu/research/wpaper.nsf/rwp/RWP02-015/$File/rwp02_015_norris_rev1.pdf)
(7)Mahmood Monshipouri and Gina Petonito, "Constructing The Enemy in
the Post-Cold War Era: The Flaws of the "Islamic Conspiracy" Theory",
Journal of Church & State, (Autumn 1995), Vol. 37, No. 4, pp. 773-792
(8)Scott Burchill and Andrew Linklater with Richard Devetak, Matthew
Paterson and Jacqui True, Theories of International Relations (New
York: St. Martin's Press, 1996)
(9)Bernard Lewis, "The Roots of Muslim Rage: Why So Many Muslims
Deeply Resent the West, and Why Their Bitterness Will Not Be Easily
Mollified", The Atlantic Monthly, Vol. 266, No.3 (September 1990), pp.
47-58
(10)Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?" Foreign
Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 3, (Summer 1993), p. 22
(11)Samuel P. Huntington, "If Not Civilizations, What?: Paradigms of
the Post-Cold War World", Foreign Affairs (November/December 1993),
pp. 187-189
(12)Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?", p. 25
(13)M.E Ahrari, "The Clash of Civilizations: An Old Story or New
Truth?", New Perspectives Quarterly, Vol. 14, No.2 (Spring 1997),
pp.56-61
(14)Samuel P. Huntington, "The West Unique, Not Universal", Foreign
Affairs, November/December 1996, p.45
(15)Samuel P. Huntington, "The West, Civilizations, and Civilization"
(16)Samuel P. Huntington, "The West, Civilizations, and Civilization"
(17)James Kurth, "The Real Clash", The National Interest, No. 37 (Fall
1994), pp. 3-15.
(18)Samuel P. Huntington, "The West, Civilizations, and Civilization"
(19)Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?", "The West,
Civilizations, and Civilization" and , "If Not Civilizations, What?:
Paradigms of the Post-Cold War World"
(20)Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart, ibid, p.14
(21)Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?", p.22
(22)Marc Gopin, "Foreword", in Shireen T. Hunter, "The Future of Islam
and the West: Clash of Civilizations or Peaceful Coexistence",
(Westport, CT: Preager and CSIS, 1998) and Fouad Ajami, "The
Summoning", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No.4 (September-October 1993),
p.7
(23)Shireen T. Hunter, "The Future of Islam and the West: Clash of
Civilizations or Peaceful Coexistence?", Fouad Ajami, M.E Ahrari, "The
Clash of Civilizations: An Old Story or New Truth?", Yuksel Sezgin,
"Does Islam Pose A Threat to the West?" Perceptions: Journal of
International Affairs, Vol. 5, No. 2, (June-August 2000)
(24)Shireen T. Hunter, "The Future of Islam and the West: Clash of
Civilizations or Peaceful Coexistence?", pp.19-20
(25)Fouad Ajami, ibid
(26)Richard E. Rubenstein and Jarle Crocker, "Challenging Huntington",
Foreign Policy, No. 96 (Fall 1994), p.115-117 and Hans Kung,
"Inter-Cultural Dialogue Versus Confrontation" (Chapter9), in Henrik
Schmiegelow (Ed.), Preventing The Clash of Civilizations: A Peace
Strategy for the Twenty-First Century (Roman Herzog With comments by
Amitai Etzioni, Hans Kung, Bassam Tibi, and Masakazu Yamazaki) (New
York: St Martin's Press, 1999), p. 103
(27)Hans Kung, "Inter-Cultural Dialogue Versus Confrontation" p.102
and Mahmood Monshipouri and Gina Petonito, "Constructing The Enemy in
the Post-Cold War Era…"
(28)Seifudein Adem Hussien, "On the End of History and the Clash of
Civilization: A Dissenter's View", Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs,
Vol. 21, No. 1 (2001), p. 32
(29)G. John Ikenberry, "Just Like the Rest", Foreign Affairs
(March-April 1997), p. 163, Richard E. Rubenstein and Jarle Crocker,
"Challenging Huntington", Foreign Policy, No. 96 (Fall 1994), p.117
(30)John L. Esposito, Political Islam: Revolution, Radicalism or
Reform, (Boulder, Co: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1997), Shireen T.
Hunter, "The Future of Islam and the West: Clash of Civilizations or
Peaceful Coexistence", Robert Marks, "The Clash of Civilizations and
the Remaking of World Order" (Book Review), Journal of World History,
Vol.11, No. 1 (Spring 2000), pp. 101-104, Richard Rosecrance, "The
Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order", (Book
Review), American Political Science Review, Vol.92, No.4 (December
1998), p978-980, John C. Raines, "The Politics of Religious
Correctness: Islam and the West", Cross Currents, Vol. 46, No. 1
(Spring 1996), pp.39-49 (It is available at:
http://www.crosscurrents.org/Raines2.htm) On conceptions of 'West' and
'Islam', especially see; Mohammed Arkoun and John Bowden, "Is Islam
Threatened by Christianity", Cross Currents, Vol. 45 No. 4 (Winter
1995-96), pp. 469-478, and Mohammed Arkoun, Rethinking Islam: Common
Questions, Uncommon Answers, Translated and edited by Robert D. Lee,
(Oxford: Westview Press, 1994)
(31)James Kurth, "The Real Clash"
(32)James Kurth, "American and the West: Global Triumph or Western
Twilight?", ORBIS (Summer 2001), pp.333-341
(33)Fred Halliday, Islam and the Myth of Confrontation: Religion, and
Politics in the Middle East (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996), p.
217 cited in Mahmood Monshipouri, "The West's Modern Encounter With
Islam: From Discourse to Reality", Journal of Church and State, Vol.
40, No.1 (Winter 1998), pp. 25-56
(34)Edward W. Said, "The Clash of Ignorance", The Nation, October 22
2001 and Mahmood Monshipouri, "The West's Modern Encounter With Islam:
From Discourse to Reality".
(35)See 30th note.
(36)Ibrahim Kalin, "Islam and the West: Deconstructing Monolithic
Perceptions- A Conversation with Professor John Esposito", Journal of
Muslim Minority Affairs, Vol. 21, No. 1 (2001), pp. 155-163
(37)M.E Ahrari, ibid, Shireen T. Hunter, "The Future of Islam and the
West: Clash of Civilizations or Peaceful Coexistence?", p.25
(38)Shireen T. Hunter, "The Future of Islam and the West: Clash of
Civilizations or Peaceful Coexistence?", p.169. On Turkish-Israeli
relations in the 1990s see also; Engin I. Erdem, From Rapprochement to
Strategic Partnership: Turkish-Israeli Relations in the 1990s,
Unpublished Master's Thesis, (Istanbul: Fatih University, 2001)
(39)Mahmood Monshipouri and Gina Petonito, ibid
(40)Robert Marks, "The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of
World Order" (Book Review)
(41)Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?", pp.24-25
(42)Fouad Ajami, p. 7-8
(43)Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?" pp.35-36
(44)Shireen T. Hunter, "The Future of Islam and the West: Clash of
Civilizations or Peaceful Coexistence?" p.
(45)Seizaburo Sato, "The Clash of Civilizations: A View from Japan",
Asia Pacific Review (October 1997) It is available at
http://sbpark.com/inn60.html.
(46)Ibrahim Kalin, ibid, p.156
(47)Mahmood Monshipouri and Gina Petonito, ibid, and Ibrahim Kalin, p.155
(48)Edward W. Said, "The Clash of Ignorance"
(49)Manochehr Dorraj, "In The Throes of Civilizational Conflict",
Peace Review, Vol. 10, No. 4 (December 1998), pp. 633-637
(50)Ibrahim Kalin, ibid, p.155
(51)Kishore Mahbubani, "The West and the Rest", National Interest,
Issue 28, (Summer 1992), pp.10-14
(52)Mahmood Monshipouri and Gina Petonito, ibid, Dario Battistella,
"Recherche Ennemi Desesperement… Response a Samuel P. Huntington a
propos d'un affrontement a venir entre l'Occident et l'Islam",
Confluences Mediterranee, No. 40 (Winter 2001-2002)
(53)Edward W. Said, "The Clash of Ignorance", Naz Wasim, "Challenging
Samuel Huntington's 'The Clash of Civilizations': The Shared Tradition
of Europe and Islam" in International Conference on the Dialogue of
Civilizations, 31 July to 3 August 2001, Tokyo and Kyoto,
http://www.unu.edu/dialogue/conf-report.pdf, For the UNU Project on
the Dialogue of Civilizations, see also http://www.unu.edu/dialogue
(54)Hans Kung, "Inter-Cultural Dialogue Versus Confrontation", p.102
(55)Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart, ibid, p.11-12
(56)Manus I. Midlarsky, "Democracy and Islam: Implications for
Civilizational Conflict and the Democratic Peace', International
Studies Quarterly, Vol. 42, No.3, 1998, pp.485-511
(57)Bruce M. Russett, John R. Oneal, Michaelene Cox, "Clash of
Civilizations, or Realism and Liberalism Deju Vu? Some evidence",
Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 37, No.5 (September 2000), pp.583-608
and "Clash of Civilizations, or Realism and Liberalism Deju Vu?' in
Bruce Russett and John R. Oneal, Triangulating Peace: Democracy,
Interdependence, and International Organizations (New York:
W.W.Norton, 2001)
(58)John Hertz and Robert Jervis has first brought 'security dilemma'
into the disciplinary agenda. "The anarchic nature of world politics
leads to a situation known as the security dilemma. The security
dilemma arises when a state feels insecure and decides that its best
policy is to increase its military strength. Its objective in doing so
is not [necessarily] to enhance its aggressive power, but only to
increase its ability to defend against attack. Unfortunately, a
neighboring country may then feel threatened by this increase of
aggressive potential. The second state might then pursue its own
military buildup. An unintended spiral thus occurs, where every nation
grows more and more insecure and seeks to stay as defended as
possible". Stephen L. Spiegel and Fred L. Wehling, World Politics in a
New Era (Orlando: Harcourt Brace College Publishers, 1995), p.8 See
also; John Hertz "Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma",
World Politics, Vol. 2, No. 2 (1950), pp.157-80, Robert Jervis,
"Cooperation Under The Security Dilemma", World Politics, Vol. 30,
No.2 (1978) and "Was the Cold War a Security Dilemma?" Journal of Cold
War Studies, Vol. 3, No.1 (2001), pp.36-60, Charles L. Glasser, "The
Security Dilemma Revisited" World Politics, Vol. 50, No.1 (1997), pp.
171-201
(59)G. John Ikenberry, "Just Like the Rest", p.162-163
(60)Kishore Mahbubani, ibid, and Seizaburo Sato, ibid
(61)For example; International Conference on Dialogue of
Civilizations, London 27-28 October 2000,
http://www.islamic-studies.org/dialconfer, International Conference on
the Dialogue of Civilizations, 31 July to 3 August 2001, Tokyo and
Kyoto, http://www.unu.edu/dialogue/conf-report.pdf, For the UNU
Project on the Dialogue of Civilizations, see also
http://www.unu.edu/dialogue, Okinawa Declaration, The International
Conference on Dialogue of Civilizations: A New peace Agenda for a New
Millennium (Okinawa, February 11-13, 2000),
http://www.dialoguecentre.org/PDF/Okinawa%20Declaration.pdf, and
OIC-EU Joint Forum (Istanbul, February 12-13, 2002) For a brief
summary of the proceedings of the forum see;
http://www.mfa.gov.tr/OIC-EU-Forum/summary.htm
(62)For instance, after the September 11 events American president
George W. Bush expressed that "Islam is a religion of peace". Cited in
Richard W. Bulliet, "The Crisis Within Islam", The Wilson Quarterly,
Vol. 26, No.1 (Winter 2002), pp. 11-19 On this issue see also; James
A. Beverley, "Is Islam a Religion of Peace", Christianity Today,
January 7, 2002
(http://www.christianitytoday.com/ct/2002/001/1.32.html)
(63)On Islam and Terror issue see; John L. Esposito, Unholy War:
Terror in the Name of Islam (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002),
Ladan Boroumand and Roya Boroumand, "Terror, Islam, and Democracy",
Journal of Democracy, Vol. 13, No. 2 (April 2002), pp.5-20
(64)The GALLUP Org, The 2002 Gallup Poll of the Islamic World,
http://www.gallup.com/poll/summits/islam.asp and USA Today, Poll
Results, February 27, 2002,
http://www.usatoday.com/news/attack/2002/02/27/usat-pollresults.htm
(65)Turkey, Muslim country, took command of the International Security
Assistance Force in Afghanistan by June 2002. See for instance; BBC
News, "Turkey Confirms ISAF Command", April 29, 2002
(http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/europe/newsid_1957000/1957866.stm),
and Turkish Daily News, "Turkey take command of ISAF", June 21, 2002
(http://www.turkishdailynews.com/old_editions/06_21_02/for.htm#f6)
(66)Shibley Telhami, Conference, "The United States, Europe, and the
Muslim World: Revitalizing Relations After September 11", May 14-15,
2002, CSIS: Islam Program, Washington D.C. For European criticisms see
also; 81st note.
(67)Interestingly, Graham Fuller talks about a 'vicious circle'.
"Under such conditions, it should not be surprising that these
frustrated populations perceive the current war against terrorism as
functionally a war against Islam. Muslim countries are the chief
target, they contend, Muslims everywhere are singled out for censure
and police attention, and U.S power works its will across the region
with little regard for deeper Muslim concerns. A vicious circle
exists: dissatisfaction leads to anti=regime action, which leads to
repression, which in turn leads to terrorism, U.S military
intervention, and finally further dissatisfaction. Samuel Huntington's
theory of a "clash of civilizations" is seemingly vindicated before
the Muslim world's eyes". Graham E. Fuller, "The Future of Political
Islam", Foreign Affairs, March/April 2002, p.54
(68)On the protests see, for instance; USA Today, "Amid protests, Bush
arrives in Europe", May 22, 2002
(http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2002/05/22/bush-europe.htm)
(69)Samuel P. Huntington, "The Age of Muslim Wars", Newsweek, Vol.
138, No. 25, (December 17 2001), pp. 42-47
(70)On Muslims in the West see, for example; Fawaz A. Gerges, "Islam
and Muslims in the Mind of America: Influences on the Making of U.S
Policy", Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 26, No. 2 (Winter 1997),
pp. 68-80, Michael W. Suleiman, ibid, Shireen T. Hunter (Ed.), Islam,
Europe's Second Religion: The New Social, Cultural, and Political
Landscape (Westport, CT: Praeger/CSIS, 2002), Shireen T. Hunter and
Huma Malik (Eds), Islam in Europe and the United States: A Comparative
Perspective, (Washington, D.C: Center for Strategic and International
Studies, 2002), Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad and John L. Esposito, Muslims on
the Americanization Path? (Atlanta, Ga: Scholars Press, 1998), Yvonne
Yazbeck Haddad, "Muslims in U.S. Politics: Recognized and Integrated,
or Seduced and Abandoned?", SAIS Review Vol.21., No.2 (Summer-Fall
2001), pp. 91-102, Muqtedar Khan, "Nice But Tough: A Framework for U.S
Foreign Policy in the Muslim World", The Brown Journal of World
Affairs, Vol.9, No.1 (Spring 2002), pp. 355-362 and American Muslims:
Bridging Faith and Freedom (Beltsville, MD: Amana Publications, 2002)
(71)There is abundant literature on Islam, Islam-the West relations.
For example see; Akbar S. Ahmed, Discovering Islam: Making Sense of
Muslim History and Society (New York, Routledge, 2002), Bernard Lewis,
"The Roots of Muslim Rage: Why So Many Muslims Deeply Resent the West,
and Why Their Bitterness Will Not Be Easily Mollified", Islam and the
West (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994) and What Went Wrong?
Western Impact and Middle Eastern Response (New York, Oxford
University Press, 2001), Edward Said, Orientalism (New York: Pantheon,
1978) and, Covering Islam: How the Media and the Experts Determine How
We See the Rest of the World, 2nd ed. (New York: Pantheon, 1997), Fred
Halliday, Islam and the Myth of Confrontation: Religion and Politics
in the Middle East, Hans Kung and Jurgen Moltmann (Eds.), "Islam: A
Challenge for Christianity", Concilium: International Journal for
Theology, 1994/3. For the content of this special issue see
http://www.concilium.org/english/ct943.htm, Ibrahim Kalin, "Islam and
the West: Deconstructing Monolithic Perceptions- A Conversation with
Professor John Esposito", Imamd-ad-Dean and Ahmad Yousef (Eds.), Islam
and the West- A Dialogue (Springfield, VA: United Association of
Studies and Research and American Muslim Foundation, 1998), John L.
Esposito, The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality? (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1992), and "Islam & Christianity Face to Face: An
Old Conflict & Prospects for a New Ending", Commonweal, Vol.124, No.2
(January 31, 1997), pp.11-16, John L. Esposito and John O. Voll,
"Islam and the West: Muslim Voices of Dialogue", Millennium: Journal
of International Studies, Volume 29, No. 3 -Special Issue: Religion
and International Relations, Mahmood Monshipouri, "The West's Modern
Encounter With Islam: From Discourse to Reality", Mohammed Arkoun, "Is
Islam Threatened by Christianity", and Rethinking Islam: Common
Questions, Uncommon Answers, Translated and edited by Robert D. Lee,
(Oxford: Westview Press, 1994), Robert Satloff, John L. Esposito,
Shibley Telhami, "Foreign Policy Debate" Propaganda, the Satans, and
Other Misunderstandings", SAIS Review, Vol. 21, No. 2 (Summer-Fall
2001), pp. 139-154 (See also other articles in this issue of
SAIS-Review), Shireen T. Hunter, "The Future of Islam and the West:
Clash of Civilizations or Peaceful Coexistence?", Shireen T. Hunter
(Ed.), The Future of Islam-West Relations: A CSIS Islamic Studies
Conference Report, (Washington D.C: Center for Strategic and
International Studies, June 30 1998)
(72)Michael W. Suleiman, "Islam, Muslims and Arabs in America: The
Other of the Other of the Other…", Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs,
Vol. 19, No. 1 (1999), p.37-44
(73)Ibrahim Kalin, ibid, p.156
(74)John L. Esposito, Political Islam: Revolution, Radicalism or
Reform, (Boulder, Co: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1997)
(75)M.E Ahrari, ibid
(76)On 'Islamic Fundamentalism', 'Islamism' and 'Political Islam' see;
Bessam Tibi, The Challenge of Fundamentalism? Political Islam and the
New World Disorder (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998),
Bobby S. Sayyid, A Fundamental Fear: Eurocentrism and the Emergence of
Islamism (London, Zed 1997), Gilles Kepel, Jihad: the Trail of
Political Islam (MA: Harvard University Press, 2002), Graham E.
Fuller, "The Future of Political Islam", Ibrahim A. Karawan, The
Islamist Impasse, Adelphi Paper 314, (London, Oxford University
Press/International Institute for Strategic Studies 1997) Jillian
Schwedler, "Islamic Identity: Myth, Menace, or Mobilizer?" SAIS
Review, Vol. 21, No.2 (Summer-Fall 2001), pp. 1-17, Joel Beinin and
Joe Stork (Eds.), Political Islam, John L. Esposito, Political Islam:
Revolution, Radicalism or Reform, (Boulder, Co: Lynne Rienner
Publishers, 1997), Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby (Eds.), The
Fundamentalism Project: A Series From the University of Chicago Press,
(1991-1995, Five Volumes), Shireen T. Hunter, "The Future of Islam and
the West: Clash of Civilizations or Peaceful Coexistence?", and Tariq
Ali, The Clash of Fundamentalisms: Crusades, Jihads and Modernity (New
York: VERSO, 2002)
(77)For arguments, which see Islam and democracy as compatible see
Abdulaziz Sachedina, Islamic Roots of Democratic Pluralism (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2001), Gudrun Kramer, "Islam and Pluralism"
in Rex Brynen Bahgat Korany, Paul Noble eds, Political Liberalization
and Democratization in the Arab World: Theoretical Perspectives
(Boulder" Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995), pp. 113-128, John L.
Esposito and John O. Voll, Islam and Democracy (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1996), Yahya Sadowsky, "The New Orientalism and the
Democracy Debate", in Joel Beinin and Joe Stork (eds.), Political
Islam (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), pp. 33-50. For
an interesting and somehow different approach see; Fethullah Gulen, "A
Comparative Approach to Islam and Democracy", SAIS Review, Vol. 21,
No. 2 (Summer-Fall 2001), pp. 133-138
(78)As mentioned before, Huntington has made fundamental even
revolutionary changes in his Newsweek article of December 2001, in
which he says here the conflict is possible but not inevitable.
(79)On unilateral- multilateral debate, see Joseph S. Nye's recent
study; The Paradox of American Power: Why the World's Only Superpower
Can't Go It Alone (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002)
(80)For instance, Shibley Telhami suggest that anti-Americanism in the
Muslim World in aftermath of September 11 is also almost an equal
reality in other parts of the world. CSIS Conference, "Conference,
"The United States, Europe, and the Muslim World: Revitalizing
Relations After September 11".
(81)On European criticisms of the U.S "unilateralism", for instance,
see William Pfaff, "The Coming Clash of Europe with America", World
Policy Journal, 15 (Winter 1998), pp. 1-9, Pascal Boniface, "The
Specter of Unilateralism", The Washington Quarterly, 24 (Summer 2001),
pp.155-162, William Wallace, "Europe, The Necessary Partner (American
Foreign Relations)", Foreign Affairs, 80 (May-June 2001), pp.16-34 and
Jessica T. Mathews, "U.S- Europe: Estranged Partners", January 11,
2002. (http://www.state.gov/s/p/of/proc/tr/7796.htm) Moreover, the
results of two polls are quite interesting to show European criticism
of perceived US unilateralism and the Bush administration. First poll
was conducted before the September 11 (August 2001) and it showed that
'overwhelming majorities of Europeans describe George W. Bush as
unilateral only with U.S. interests'. The second poll was conducted
after the September 11 (April 2002) and it demonstrated a much more
support to the Bush's foreign policy. However, European people have
been still very anxious about the Bush administration's policies and
rhetoric of 'war against terrorism' and 'axis of evil'. Large
majorities of Europeans (up to 85 percent of Germans) said that 'the
U.S not taking the allies' interests into account in its conduct of
the war on terror. "Bush Gets Low Marks in Europe", International
Herald Tribune, August 15, 2001 and "Bush's marks rise in Europe in
Europe", International Herald Tribune, April 17, 2002.
(82)Samuel P. Huntington, "The Age of Muslim Wars"
(83) Ibid.
(84)On the role of religion in international relations see;
Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Volume 29, No. 3
-Special Issue: Religion and International Relations-
(85)Indonesian President Abdurrahman Wahid uses this phrase. Sydney
Morning Herald, "The Clash of Civilizations?", April 17, 2002
(86)Cited in John C. Raines, "The Politics of Religious Correctness:
Islam and the West", Cross Currents, Vol. 46, No. 1 (Spring 1996),
pp.39-49 It is available at http://www.crosscurrents.org/Raines2.htm
(87)"Henry Nau, "Chapter 7:Beyond Indifference: American Relations
with the Developing World" in At Home Abroad: Identity and Power in
American Foreign Policy (Cornell Studies in Political Economy), (New
York: Cornell University Press, 2002), pp. 190-236
The 'Clash of Civilizations': Revisited after September 11
Engin I. Erdem*
The dissolution of the Soviet Union not only ended the Cold War era
but also it terminated simplistic understanding of world politics,
which was dominant during this time. The bloc mentality of the Cold
War has no longer provided an outlook to delineate the picture of the
new period. By the end of the Cold War, henceforth, students of
international relations have witnessed several 'contending images of
world politics'(1). The images are basically concerned with redefining
the newly emerging world politics. Interestingly, all of these images
originate in the West and in the United States in particular.(2) The
linkage is in fact significant as it demonstrates knowledge-power
relationship in international relations. Of these 'western' images of
world politics, especially Francis Fukayama's the 'End of History'(3)
and Samuel P. Huntington's the 'Clash of Civilizations?' have earned
utmost attention. In contrast to Fukayama's optimistic vision of
future, Huntington has called forth World War III that stems from
clash of civilizations.(4) He predicts that 'fundamental' differences
among the seven or eight major civilizations will more likely pave way
to global turmoil in years to come.
This paper, aims at revisiting the 'clash of civilizations' thesis in
post-September 11 world, is consisted of six parts. After introductory
section, second section will deal with Huntington's arguments, which
take place in his article, book, and his respond to the criticisms. In
the third part, seven categories of criticisms on Huntington's thesis
will take place. Then, the thesis will be re-examined in aftermath of
September 11. The fifth section will briefly touch upon Islam-the West
relations. Finally, there will be a concluding part, which offers
several remarks about the clash thesis and the delicate nature of
Islam-the West relations in the new epoch of world politics after
September 11.
INTRODUCTION
George F. Kennan's 'X' article in Foreign Affairs of July 1947(5) not
only pioneered the U.S policy of containment during the Cold War but
also the article overwhelmingly framed the agenda of international
relations (IR) and U.S foreign policy thereafter. 'X' article later
became one of the most cited studies in the field of international
relations. In similar to Kennan's article, Harvard professor of
political science, Samuel P. Huntington's 'The Clash of
Civilizations?' article, which published in Foreign Affairs of Summer
1993 has significantly shaped the post-Cold War discourse(s) of IR and
U.S foreign policy. Proponents of the civilizational clash thesis and
its critics afterward have created a 'clash of scholarship'(6) in the
field. The clash of scholarship indeed has primarily induced 'fruitful
debates'(7), and it has brought the following questions into the
forefront of disciplinary agenda.
What is the nature of the newly emerging international system in
aftermath of the end of the Cold War? Which theory, paradigm or model
of IR does have the most descriptive, explanatory, prescriptive and
predictive power(8) to portray the post-Cold War world politics?
What causes to international conflict and war? Do either a clash of
'national interests' or divergent values, ideas, cultures, identities,
and civilizations primarily lead to conflict at both regional and
global levels?
How should the U.S foreign policy be re-formulated according to the
changing nature of world politics by the end of the Cold War? How
should the United States re-define its 'national interests' and
re-assess its 'strategic priorities'?
How the West-Islam relations are going to be developed in the new era
of global politics? Does/Should the United States, who is the world's
only superpower of the new era have a policy towards Islam/the Muslim
World, if yes and, how should the U.S have a policy? What is the
likely future of Islam-the West relations; conflictual or cooperative?
Does Islam compatible with democracy? Should the U.S continue to
support autocratic/authoritarian regimes in the Muslim Middle East in
order to pursue its 'strategic' interests or should the United States
reconsider and even change the policy?
While Samuel P. Huntington's the 'Clash of Civilizations?" thesis has
directed substantial attention to these questions, the critics of
Huntington have also extended the discussion further. The debate, on
the other hand, has come back into world agenda in the aftermath of
September 11 attacks.
The September 11, which is the single most remarkable event after the
Cold War, no doubt has created numerous expectations about the
changing nature of post-Cold War international system and global
politics. Ironically, it has demonstrated that how the world's only
superpower is not immune from the dangers and fragility of current
international system. On the other hand, the September 11 has
seriously questioned patterns of U.S foreign policy and especially its
policy towards the Middle East. Not surprisingly, Samuel P.
Huntington's clash of civilizations thesis has frequently taken place
in post-September 11 debates. Henceforth, fourth part of the paper
will be about the clash thesis in connection with the 9/11. Prior to
Huntington's critiques and the September 11, however, one should first
look at essentials of the clash of civilizations thesis, which take
place in the ensuing section.
WALKING THROUGH HUNTINGTONIAN WORLD
Well before Huntington's 'the Clash of Civilizations?' article in
Foreign Affairs of Summer 1993, Bernard Lewis, well-known historian
and scholar of Princeton University, talked about the 'clash' in
September 1990 as follow.
It should by now clear that we are facing a mood and a movement far
transcending the level of issues and policies and the governments that
pursue them. This is no less than a clash of civilizations the perhaps
irrational but surely historic reaction of an ancient rival against
our Judeo-Christian heritage, our secular present, and the worldwide
expansion of both. It is crucially important that we on our side
should not be provoked into an equally historic but equally irrational
reaction against that rival.(9)
Three years after Bernard Lewis's Atlantic Monthly article, Samuel P.
Huntington came with a similar argument. In the first page of his
famous article, Huntington presented his civilizational conflict
paradigm;
It is my hypothesis that the fundamental source of conflict in this
new world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The
great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict
will be cultural. Nation states will remain the most powerful actors
in world affairs, but the principal conflicts of global politics will
occur between nations and groups of different civilizations. The clash
of civilizations will dominate global politics. The fault lines
between civilizations will be battle lines of the future.(10)
Huntington's clash of civilizations thesis first of all endeavors to
offer a new paradigm of world politics. Hence, it is basically about
international relations theory. In contrast to state-centric realist
theory and system-dominated neo-realist model, Huntington primarily
focuses on cultural-religious-civilizational factors. He calls forth a
paradigmatic shift to understand the post-Cold War global politics. He
argues that his 'civilizational conflict paradigm' is superior to the
alternative models, which have been developed after the Cold War.
Since inter-civilizational issues are replacing inter-superpower ones
in the new era, he argues, his paradigm provides better than any
alternative.(11)
Huntington asserts that civilizational differences, which stem from
divergent cultural and religious values will be primary causes of
regional and global conflicts in the post-Cold War epoch. The clash of
civilizations is inevitable though not necessarily to be violent. The
fault lines between civilizations stem from differences in social and
political values. Civilizations, Huntington says, have 'different
values on the relations between God and man, the individual and group,
the citizen and state, parents and children, husband and wife, as well
as differing views of the relative importance of rights and
responsibilities, liberty and authority, equality and
hierarchy'.(12)seven or eight major civilizations, he claims,
especially Islamic and Western civilizations have more likely to be
clashed because Islam is the only civilization that aspires
universalist values and poses a significant challenge to the West. On
the other hand, Huntington talks about an Islamic-Confucian connection
against the Western civilization. In doing so, he recommends that the
West should limit expansion of Islamic-Confucian states' military and
economic power and the West should exploit differences between the two
civilizations.
Besides, Huntington is highly concerned with de-Westernization and
indigenization of elites as well as non-Western modernization in many
non-Western countries. The West and the United States especially,
Huntington argues, should be cautious about this development. In this
regard, the West should control immigration and assimilate immigrants
in order to preserve and reify civilizational homogeneity. As he
extensively concerns with the status of Western power and unity,
Huntington also calls for improvement of Western unity. In this
respect, he recommends empowerment of the Atlantic partnership between
the US and Europe. In order to realize civilizational homogeneity of
the West he attributes NATO a 'civilizational mission'(13) Then, he
recommends that Turkey and Greece should be out of NATO for the
purpose of West's civilizational coherence.(14)
Huntington argues that the rest can hardly copy the West since he West
is not universal but unique. For this reason, the West should not
aspire universalism. Otherwise, it will lead to resentment in
non-Western world since universalism is perceived as imperialism by
the rest.(15). In the words of Huntington;
Western universalism is dangerous to the world because it could lead
to a major intercivilizational war between core states and it is
dangerous to the West…Multiculturalism at home threatens the US and
the West; universalism abroad threatens the West and the world, both
deny the uniqueness of Western culture(16)
Moreover, Huntington favors Americanization and denounces
multiculturalism. He criticizes multiculturalist tendencies in the
United States since it weakens the 'American creed'(17). 'A
multicivilizational United States will not be the US, it will be the
UN'(18). The anti-multiculturalist standing, however, has far-reaching
implications for minority groups including the Muslims in the United
States.
Finally, one of the most interesting and remarkable parts of
Huntington's clash thesis is that his presentation of several policy
recommendations. These advices are primarily related to American
politics and US foreign policy. Of especially critical importance, the
recommendations as follow;
For Domestic Politics
Tightening immigration and assimilating immigrants and minorities in
order to increase the civilizational coherence. Otherwise the US would
be a 'cleft country'.
Instead multiculturalism pursuing policy of Americanization
For the US Foreign and Security Policy
Maintaining Western technological and military superiority over other
civilizations.
Enhancing the Western unity by means of pursuing Atlanticist policy.
Hence, the US should empower trans-Atlantic cooperation
Limiting the expansion of Islamic-Confucian states' military and
economic power and exploiting differences between these states.
Avoiding universalist aspiration since the West is unique not
universalist. Not to intervene in the affairs of other civilizations.
In case of a World War III, which civilizational differences are high
likely to cause the United States should get Japan, Latin American
states and Russia in her side against potential Islamic-Confucian
cooperation.(19)
These policy recommendations, which are tremendously provocative, have
generated great amount of attention in both the United States/West and
the rest of the world. Henceforth, it has drawn several criticisms.
Critiques to Huntington's policy recommendations as well as other
criticisms of the clash thesis will take place in the following
section.
BEYOND HUNTINGTONIAN WORLD
Not surprisingly, Samuel P. Huntington's 'thought-provoking' and/or
provocative the 'Clash of Civilizations?' essay has attracted
voluminous attention in all over the world and it has resulted in a
'clash of scholarship'(20). Though the thesis touches upon rich array
of issues, international relations theory, the U.S foreign policy and
Islam-the West/Islam-democracy relations have become the major areas
of contention. In this section, the paper incorporates major
criticisms of Huntington's civilizational clash thesis. In doing so,
seven types of criticisms deserve the most attention.
First of all, Huntington has been criticized for his presentation of
'new paradigm'. He argues that the dominant Cold War paradigm of
state-centric realist model can no longer be useful to understand the
post-Cold War era and claims that civilizational differences will be
primary source of regional and global conflicts.(21) The critics
suggest that Huntington's 'civilizational conflict paradigm' is
reductionist and deterministic since there are multiple causes of
conflict, in which civilizational factors do not play significant
role.(22) In opposed to Huntington, many also have argued that 'clash
of interests' rather than 'clash of civilizations' will continue to be
real cause of conflict.(23) For instance, Shireen T. Hunter argues
that problematic relations between the West and the Muslim World are
hardly stemmed from civilizational differences as Huntington argues
but from structural-political and economic- inequalities between the
two worlds of 'have' and 'have nots'.(24) On the other hand, Fouad
Ajami contends that Huntington overestimates cultural differences
between civilizations while he underestimates the influence of the
West in the hostile relations with the Muslim World.(25) The critics
argue that Huntington does not come up with a 'new paradigm' since his
thesis fits into 'political realism' par excellence(26). They contend
that Huntington follows bloc based Cold War mentality while he is
basically concerned with the West's technological and military
superiority.(27) They also suggest that Huntington's 'Machivellian'
advice of exploiting differences between Islamic and Confucian
civilizations can only be considered within the 'realist' realm.(28)
On the other hand, G. John Ikenberry argues that Huntington calls
forth a new Cold War. In similar to Ikenberry, Rubenstein and Crocker
assert that Huntington proclaims; 'long live the new Cold War'.(29) In
sum, Huntington has received several criticisms on the basis of his
'new paradigm'.
Second category of criticisms is about Huntington's 'monolithic'
conception of civilizations and ignorance of intra-civilizational
differences and domestic conflict. Many critics argue that Huntington
has monolithic conception of the 'West' and 'Islam', in which
polycentric structure of both worlds has been totally neglected.(30)
On one side, there is a serious contention of multiculturalism vs.
Americanization in the U.S, which James Kurth labels it as the 'real
clash'.(31) Kurth argues that the idea of West has undergone a
significant transformation in turn of the 21st century, and the real
clash will happen not between the West and the rest, as Huntington
assumes, but it will arise between pro-Western conservatives and
post-Western liberal multiculturalists in the U.S/West.(32) On the
other side, the critics contend that Huntington ignores internal
dynamics, plurality and 'myriad complexities'(33) of Islam/the Muslim
World.(34) They argue that there is no single Islamic culture as
Huntington implies but there are multiple centers of Islam and various
types of political Islam and Islamism in the Muslim World.(35) For
this reason, some critics call for 'de-constructing monolithic
perceptions' of Islam and the West.(36) Furthermore, there are
numerous conflicts within civilizations. For instance, M.E Ahrari and
S. Hunter ask Huntington how Iraqi and Turkish treatment of Kurds can
demonstrate civilizational unity and coherence.(37) Besides, it may
happen more cooperation between two countries that come from different
civilizations than those of the same civilization. Hunter gives the
example of Turkey's strategic relations with Israel in the 1990s when
a time its relations with the Arab World and Iran were generally
problematic.(38) In sum, second sort of criticisms focuses on
diversity and dynamics of each civilization and intra-civilizational
differences/domestic conflict. To these critics, neither the West nor
other civilizations is monolithic and domestic
conflicts/intra-civilizational differences matter more than
civilizational conflicts.
Third, Huntington has pulled many criticisms because of the alleged
inconsistencies, methodological flaws, and overgeneralizations in his
thesis as well as for his reading of history and 'selective
perception'.(39) For instance, Robert Marks argues that Huntington
mostly uses secondary sources in his book and he has weak scholarship
of Islam, China and Japan.(40) Marks also suggest that Huntington's
theory is methodologically flawed because of his frequent
overgeneralizations in the analysis of civilizations. On the other
hand, many argue that Huntington's thesis has several inconsistencies.
For example, he mentions both 'Arab' and 'Islamic' civilizations.(41)
Moreover, many have also criticized the cases, which Huntington uses
to support his thesis. Fouad Ajami, for instance, contends that the
Gulf War is a case for 'clash of state interests' par excellence not a
case for 'clash of civilizations'.(42) Interestingly, Huntington
upholds his thesis with King Hussein of Jordan, which he said the war
happens between the West and Islam.(43) However, Huntington probably
should know that the coalition that formed against Saddam Hussein was
composed of several Muslim states including Turkey and Saudi Arabia.
In similar to Ajami's criticism of the Gulf War case, Hunter
criticizes Huntington's use of Armenian-Azerbaijan conflict as
civilizational clash since she argues that Muslim Iran had more
friendly relations with 'Christian' Armenians than 'Muslim'
Azerbaijan.(44) Furthermore, Seizaburo Sato asks Huntington why he
suggests getting Japan against potential Islamic-Confucian alignment
while he earlier defined Japan as economic threat to the West. Sato
also questions Huntington's advice to get Russia into the EU since he
also puts Russia as the core state of Slavic-Orthodox
civilization.(45) In this respect, the critics have focused on vast
generalizations and 'inconsistencies'.
Fourth, the clash of civilizations thesis has attracted considerable
amount of criticism on the basis of its language of 'us' and 'them' or
its embedded epistemology of 'othering'.(46) The critics generally
hold that Huntington's understanding of Islam-the West relations is
fundamentally based upon orientalist scholarship of Islam, in which
Islam is perceived as a problem and even a threat to the West.(47)
Edward Said, a well-known critic of orientalism, contends that
Huntington's thesis has orientalist backdrop, hence it always
privileges the West and ignores the other (Islam). For Said, this
approach is less likely to lead any critical understanding of 'other'
but it only feeds self-pride. He also argues that there is a 'clash of
ignorance' rather than 'clash of civilizations'.(48) On the other
hand, Manochehr Dorraj, argues that the clash thesis reifies,
distorts, and de-humanizes the Muslims.(49) Finally, the critics argue
that perceiving the 'other' as a 'threat' instead a 'challenge'(50),
leads to 'siege mentality', which originate from 'Western hubris'.(51)
Fifth category of criticisms is about Huntington's policy
recommendations on the basis of his interpretation of post-Cold War
global politics. The critics, first of all, questions Huntington's
'enemy' discourse, in which Islamic and Confucian civilizations are
perceived as a threat to the West. Monshipouri, Petonito and
Battistella contend that Huntington looks for new enemies, which
replace the adversary of the Cold War, the Soviet Union.(52) Said and
Wasim, on the other hand, argue that Huntington's theory is an
ideological and strategic theory that aims at influencing the US
foreign and defense policy.(53) In this regard, Hans Kung pinpoints
the fact that Huntington was an advisor to Pentagon in 1994 while his
thesis has become so popular in all over the world. Kung also suggests
that Huntington's scenario of World War III that stems from clash of
civilizations interestingly fits best into military and
representatives of arms industry.(54) In this respect, the 'clash of
civilizations' is considered as 'purposeful thesis' as it aims at
guiding the US foreign and security policy. Moreover, some scholars
criticize Huntington's advice to pursue 'Atlanticist policy', by
increasing the relations with Europe against 'Islamic-Confucian
connection'. According to John Ikenberry, Huntington's vision
originates from bloc mentality and his approach is significantly
dangerous for the United States and international peace. In sum,
Huntington has taken many criticisms for the policy recommendations.
Sixth, as stated above, the 'Clash of Civilizations?' article has
produced 'fruitful debates' within the discipline of international
relations. Then the discipline has witnessed several empirical studies
about the thesis. These studies constitute the sixth type of
critiques. Of these empirical studies, Pippa Norris and Ronald
Inglehart's study is especially remarkable. They have compared
political and social values of the Western and Muslim societies by
using World Values Survey database. Norris and Inglehart,
'surprisingly', have found that Muslims have no less democratic ideals
than the West and 'the West is not distinctive to Islam in its faith
in democracy'.(55) In this respect, their study has considerably
falsified Huntington's assumption that Islam and the West have
fundamentally different political values based upon predominant
religious cultures. The study demonstrates the existence of similar
political attitudes in the Muslim World and the West. Manus
Midlarsky's empirical study has also produced a similar conclusion
that there is no negative association between Islam and democracy,
which Huntington assumes to lead civilizational conflict.(56)
Moreover, Bruce Russett, John Oneal and Michaelene Cox have looked for
the significance of cultural/civilizational variables in causing
international conflict. Their study is based on University of
Michigan's Correlates of War Project, which keeps data of all
militarized inter-state disputes from 1885 to 1994. They have finally
found that realist and liberal variables of conflict (realist
variables-geography, power, alliances and liberal variables-democracy,
economic interdependence and international organizations) not
civilizations matter most in international conflict and
cooperation.(57) Hence, all these three empirical studies pose
significant challenge to the clash of civilizations thesis.
Last but not least, Samuel Huntington's thesis has been harshly
criticized as claiming that the 'clash of civilizations' will likely
to be a 'self-fulfilling prophecy'. It means that Huntington's thesis
causes the expected event-clash of civilizations- to occur and so the
thesis confirms it own 'accuracy'. On the other hand, John Ikenberry
says that Huntington's thesis is civilizational equivalent of
'security dilemma', in which misperceptions about the other eventually
increases the tension and then leads to conflict(58). He also suggests
'if ideas by prominent thinkers have any impact on the real world' the
clash thesis is potentially dangerous.(59) On the other hand, both
Mahbubani and Sato contend that Huntington's policy recommendations,
if applied, will be so dangerous and they will cause a disaster for
international peace and security.(60) Furthermore, many have
criticized Huntington for his pessimistic vision of future and
ignorance the fact that cooperation and dialogue among civilizations
are possible. For this reason, it is not coincidence that several
conferences on civilizational dialogue have been organized recently,
probably as a response to the 'clash of civilizations'.(61)
The seven types of criticisms, which are mentioned above constitute a
substantial challenge to Samuel Huntington's thesis. Huntington
responded some of these critiques in his "If Not Civilizations,
What?:Paradigms of the Post-Cold War World" article in Foreign Affairs
of November/December 1993 and his 'Clash of Civilizations" book. The
debate has however continued thereafter. Finally, the September 11 has
greatly influenced the debate. The following section will deal with
the issue especially focusing on the question; how the debate will
likely to make a sense for the post-9/11 world politics?
A CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS IN POST-SEPTEMBER 11 WORLD?
To what extent the September 11 has influenced the debate for the
'clash of civilizations'. Is the post-September 11 world fitting more
to Huntington's frame? How Huntington has revisited or even
'falsified' the thesis by his own article in Newsweek of December
2001? These are interesting questions come into mind. This section
will mainly deal with these questions. Yet, one should first look at
major developments that happened after the tragic events of September
11.
First of all, Islam-the West relations have gained an increasing
attention after September 11. Even though many in the West have
rightly reiterated that Islam is religion of peace(62) and Al-Quida
cannot be considered as representative of Islam, Islam vs. terror
debate has frequently come into agenda.(63) Not unexpectedly, the
Western media looked at 'Islamic roots' of the terrible attacks.
Thereafter, 'Islam', 'Islamism', 'political Islam' and 'Islamic
fundamentalism' became the most frequently used terms in the media.
Not surprisingly, the 'clash of civilizations' has also extensively
taken place in this time.
Second, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict has overwhelmingly topped
into regional and global agenda as a result of increasing tension in
the region. The conflict has accelerated the debate for 'clash of
civilizations', asking the question; to what extent the conflict can
be considered within the realm of clash of civilizations?
Third, anti-Americanism has significantly increased in the Muslim
World in aftermath of the September 11. According to the recent Gallup
poll, there is considerable distrust of the United States after
September 11.(64) This is also other important development that
increased interest over the clash thesis.
Does post-September 11 world really fit into to the clash thesis? The
answer seems to be no because of the following reasons. First, the
United States led- campaign in Afghanistan has acquired significant
support from the Muslim World. Even Iran has supported the U.S led
campaign and Turkey has played an active role in the campaign(65) One
may talk about global coalition against terrorism, which across
different civilizations. The growing anti-American sentiments,
however, is not limited to the Muslim World since it is a fact in
elsewhere including 'Western' Europe.(66) The growing anti-Americanism
is in fact not about civilizational values but primarily about the
U.S's Mideast policy. The United States is criticized especially for
its alleged unbalanced, pro-Israeli policy in the Palestinian-Israeli
conflict and because of its cooperation with authoritarian-repressive
regimes of the Middle East.(67) Anti-Americanism is, on the other
hand, especially very related to the Bush administration. The
administration's 'axis of evil' rhetoric has attracted serious
criticisms not only from the Muslim world but also from Europe.(68)
Furthermore, US hegemony and unilateralism not 'Western-Christian-
values can be considered as cause of growing anti-American sentiments
in the Muslim world. In this respect, ignoring the different political
perspectives within the 'Western' civilization and talking about
'clash of civilizations' is considerably questionable.
In revisiting the clash thesis after September 11, it is noteworthy
mentioning about Huntington's 'The Age of Muslim Wars' article in
Newsweek of December 2001. Though Huntington argues here that 'the
makings exist for a clash of civilizations between Muslim and
non-Muslims and he also argues that reactions to September 11 and the
American response were strictly along civilizational lines'(69) he
makes fundamental revisions in his earlier standing, which take place
in his 'Clash of Civilizations?' article and book. First of all,
Huntington now begins to argue that civilizational conflict is
possible but not inevitable while he had earlier said it is
inevitable. Second, he now maintains that 'the age of Muslim wars has
roots in more general causes that do not include the inherent nature
of Islamic doctrine or beliefs. The clash of contemporary Muslim wars
lies in politics not 7th religious doctrines'. In this regard, he
refutes his earlier point that ontological differences of the Western
and Islamic civilizations-without talking about political factors-
inevitably produce the clash. Third, Huntington now underscores the
fact that the Muslim people reacts to the Western governments as they
support 'corrupt, ineffective, and repressive' governments. Fourth,
interestingly Huntington now recommends that hostility towards the
West could be reduced by changes in US policy toward Israel. In doing
so, he accepts the difference between the clash of civilizations,
which based upon divergent ontological worlds and anxiety towards to
US policies. Fifth, he also now talks about probability of peaceful
-'clash of civilizations' free- world politics in the future. This
also constitutes a great contradiction with his previous standing. In
sum, Huntington's Newsweek article, 'the Age of Muslim Wars', deserves
great attention to reconsider the clash thesis after September 11.
A BRIEF NOTE ON ISLAM-THE WEST RELATIONS AFTER SEPTEMBER 11
The tragedy of September 11, not unexpectedly, deeply sensitized
Islam-the West relations and especially the U.S relations with the
Muslim World. Then, the following questions have become of critical
importance; how does the 'clash of civilizations' discourse make an
impact on the post-9/11 relations between the Muslim World and the
West/the U.S? How the event will influence perceptions of Islam and
the Muslims in the mind of Western elites and people? How will the
Muslims in the United States and Europe likely to be influenced by
post-September 11 developments?(70) These questions are obviously of
profound importance and they will most likely to be centerpiece of
numerous debates thereafter.
Samuel P. Huntington's clash of civilizations paradigm unquestionably
has menacing implications for Islam-the West relations.(71) As
mentioned earlier, Huntington's understanding of Islam basically bases
upon orientalist scholarship of Islam, in which Islam-'the other' is
being depicted as a threat and even an enemy to the West. It also
fosters and/or justifies negative images and stereotypes of
Islam/Muslims such as 'violent, terroristic, backward, and
immoral'.(72) The negative stereotypes eventually distract the West
from the search for critical understanding and dialogue with Islam/the
Muslim World. In this respect, Huntington's perspective of Islam is
considerably parallel to orientalist scholarship's story of conflict
rather than dialogue or at least peaceful coexistence between the two
worlds. Neo-third worldist or anti-orientalist scholarship of Islam,
on the other hand, portrays a different scheme of Islam-the West
relations. As pointed earlier, this scholarship deeply criticizes
orientalist 'epistemology of othering'(73) and the depiction of Islam
as a threat and enemy. It also has a different historical perspective
of Islam-the West relations. This scholarship emphasizes long periods
of peaceful coexistence between the two worlds. Moreover,
anti-orientalist scholars, such as John Esposito emphasize diversity
and plurality of the Muslim World by drawing attention towards various
'Islams', and 'Islamisms'.(74) Finally, they recommend that critical
understanding and dialogue between the two sides are of crucial
importance especially in the increasingly transnational and
interdependent world.(75)
The mentioned differences between orientalist and anti-orientalist
scholarship of Islam also appear in regard to divergent views of
'political Islam', 'Islamism' and 'Islamic fundamentalism'.(76)
Monolithic perceptions of orientalist perspective are also clear in
understanding of these phenomenons. This perspective generally depicts
those phenomenons as a great threat to 'Western civilization' as well
as to Western interests. On the other hand, anti-orientalist
perspective emphasizes the plurality and multi-dimensionality of
'political Islam', 'Islamism' and 'Islamic revivalism' by underscoring
various historical and political contexts within the Muslim World.
Moreover, the divergence between orientalist and anti-orientalist
scholarship of Islam also appears on Islam vs. democracy debate;
whether Islam and democracy is compatible. Expectedly, orientalist
scholarship underscores the inherent incompatibility while the other
side argues that Islam and democracy are compatible.(77)
The clash of civilizations thesis, no doubt, has considerably negative
implications for Islam-the West relations. First of all, it creates a
great setback for the West to recognize diversity and plurality of the
Muslim World and various interpretations of Islam. It closes all
avenues for dialogue with the 'other'. Moreover, it draws a very
pessimistic outlook for future of the relations, as Huntington
foresees, Islam and the West will inevitably clash though it may not
be violent.(78) Keeping Huntington's confrontational vision in mind,
the 9/11 might at first be seen as a case to validate the thesis. Yet,
the reality is hardly like that because of the two major reasons
First, American campaign against al-Quida terrorist organization has
received full support from the Muslim World including Iran, which has
the very hostile and problematic relations with the United States.
Yet, it does not necessarily mean that the whole Muslim World supports
the Bush administration's 'war against terrorism' and 'axis of evil'
discourse. The criticisms, however, are hardly related with
'civilizational differences' but they are mostly about the Bush
administration's unilateralism.(79) Besides, as mentioned above, these
criticisms are not restricted to the Muslim world.(80) European elites
and people have considerably criticized the Bush administration before
and after September 11 too.(81) In this respect, it is wrong to say
that American campaign against al-Quida and the growing anti-American
sentiments in the Muslim World after September 11 validates the clash
of civilizations thesis.
Second, the growing anti-Americanism in aftermath of September 11 is
also significantly dealt with the US policy towards the
Palestinian-Israeli conflict and its policy of supporting
authoritarian and repressive regimes for the sake of the 'strategic
interests'. As many- including Huntington(82)- argue that, the U.S may
alleviate the negative sentiments if she revises its policy toward the
region.(83) In this respect, the Muslim anxiety towards the United
States is deeply related to 'clash of policies-interests' not 'clash
of civilizations'. This also seems to be remained as a fact in
post-9/11 period.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
"The Clash of Civilizations?", 'X' article of the post-Cold War,
period has resulted in 'clash of scholarship' in both academic and
policy circles. This paper, first of all, endeavors to examine
Huntington's thesis and its critiques. Then, it briefly evaluates the
thesis in the post-September 11 world. In this final section, several
concluding remarks take place.
First of all, Harvard Professor, Samuel P. Huntington is right in the
sense that culture and religion considerably matter in aftermath of
the Cold War.(84) Cultural and religious elements not played
considerable role during the Cold War especially because of the strict
bipolar system in this time. The new era of global politics, on the
other hand, allows various ethnic, religious and cultural elements
come into forefront of regional and global politics. Numerous ethnic
conflicts and wars after the Cold War such as in Bosnia, Kosova,
Somalia, and Rwanda demonstrate the increasing importance of culture
and ethnicity. However, it does not mean that civilizational
differences, overlooking the struggles for power and interest, are
primary sources of conflict in this period. Besides, it is hard to
accept that Huntington's clash of civilizations model offers a 'new
paradigm'. Premises of classical realism- 'balance of power'
'interest' and 'alliances' essentially circumscribe the clash thesis.
Huntington deeply concerns with state of Western power vis-à-vis other
'civilizations' power'. (Remember, for example, his advice to empower
Atlantic partnership against 'Islamic-Confucian connection')
Second, Huntington's thesis basically depends on orientalist
understandings of Islam, in which Islam-the 'other'- is perceived as
culturally inferior to the West and identified as threat and even
enemy. This understanding ignores the diversity, plurality and various
dynamics of Islam/the Muslim World as well as that of 'Islamism' and
'Islamic fundamentalism'. This approach, however, closes the avenues
for mutual understanding and dialogue as well as it leads to 'clash of
misunderstandings'.(85) Moreover, Huntington has a selective
perception in choosing cases in order to enforce his argument. For
instance, he probably should know that the Gulf War is dealt with
'clash of interests', yet he exemplifies the War as a case for 'clash
of civilizations'. Furthermore, Huntington underestimates probability
of cooperation and dialogue among civilizations and between states,
which come from different civilizations. Besides, as one of the most
problematic points is that Huntington ignores the role of Western
colonialism and hegemony in Muslim anxiety towards the West. However,
as James Scott rightly suggests that 'wherever there is domination one
also finds resistance'(86).
Third, US action is very crucial for the future of Islam-the West
relations. As the world's only superpower, the United States should be
cautious about Muslim concerns in related to both Palestinian-Israeli
conflict and democratization process in the Middle East. The United
States encounters a dilemma in this regard; how it converges its
ideals of democracy and freedom with concerns of 'power and interest'.
The Muslim peoples have a conviction that the West/U.S pursues double
standards when democracy and human rights deal with the Muslim World.
The U.S should not enforce this belief in the Muslim World by ignoring
people's democratic demands for the sake of stability of its
"strategic interests'. As Henry Nau rightly proposes, the United
States should follow a coherent policy towards the Muslim Middle East
by converging his identity and power(87). Otherwise, the growing
anti-American sentiments in the Muslim World will continue to harm the
relations between the West/U.S and the Muslim World.
Fourth, the West and the Muslim World should be open to critical
dialogue and mutual understanding. The 'clash of civilizations'
discourse creates a great obstacle for this effort. The need for
dialogue between the two worlds in particular and among all
civilizations in general is especially clear in increasingly
transnational and interdependent world. Otherwise, the 'clash of
civilizations' would be self-fulfilling prophecy. To blame the other
and to abstain from self-criticisms does not produce a sustainable
solution for the problems between the two worlds. Dialogue and mutual
understanding is the only way for a promising future.
Fifth, as frequently stated above, the 'clash of civilizations' has
resulted in a 'clash of scholarship' in the fields of international
relations, American foreign and security policy as well as in dealing
with Islam-the West relations. In this respect, the clash thesis has
made important contribution in these areas. Lastly, the September 11
has vitalized the debate and sensitized the relations between the West
and the Muslim World. As asked earlier, the following questions have
become of profound importance; how does the 'clash of civilizations'
discourse make an impact on the post-9/11 relations between the Muslim
World and the West/the U.S? How the 9/11 will influence perceptions of
Islam and the Muslims in the mind of Western elites and people? How
will the Muslims in the United States and Europe likely to be
influenced by post-September 11 developments? This paper has only
touched upon these issues in brief; hence they urgently call for
further studies.
*Engin I. Erdem is PhD Student in Department of Politics at University
of Virginia.
ENDNOTES
(1)Greg Fry and Jacinta O'Hagan (Eds.), Contending Images of World
Politics, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2001)
(2)Fry and O'Hagan, "Introduction" in Contending Images of World
Politics, pp. 15-18
(3)Francis Fukayama, "The End of History", The National Interest,
No.16, Summer 1989 and The End of History and the Last Man (New York:
Avon Books, 1992)
(4)Samuel P. Huntington, "The West, Civilizations, and Civilization",
in The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New
York: Simon & Shuster 1996)
(5)X, "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," Foreign Affairs Vol.25, No. 4
(July 1947) (Reprinted in Foreign Affairs, Vol.65, No. 4 (Spring
1987), pp. 852-868
(6)Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart, "Islam and the West; Testing the
Clash of Civilizations Thesis", John F. Kennedy School of Government,
Harvard University, Faculty Research Working Papers Series
(RWP02-015), April 2002, p.14
(http://ksgnotes1.harvard.edu/research/wpaper.nsf/rwp/RWP02-015/$File/rwp02_015_norris_rev1.pdf)
(7)Mahmood Monshipouri and Gina Petonito, "Constructing The Enemy in
the Post-Cold War Era: The Flaws of the "Islamic Conspiracy" Theory",
Journal of Church & State, (Autumn 1995), Vol. 37, No. 4, pp. 773-792
(8)Scott Burchill and Andrew Linklater with Richard Devetak, Matthew
Paterson and Jacqui True, Theories of International Relations (New
York: St. Martin's Press, 1996)
(9)Bernard Lewis, "The Roots of Muslim Rage: Why So Many Muslims
Deeply Resent the West, and Why Their Bitterness Will Not Be Easily
Mollified", The Atlantic Monthly, Vol. 266, No.3 (September 1990), pp.
47-58
(10)Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?" Foreign
Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 3, (Summer 1993), p. 22
(11)Samuel P. Huntington, "If Not Civilizations, What?: Paradigms of
the Post-Cold War World", Foreign Affairs (November/December 1993),
pp. 187-189
(12)Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?", p. 25
(13)M.E Ahrari, "The Clash of Civilizations: An Old Story or New
Truth?", New Perspectives Quarterly, Vol. 14, No.2 (Spring 1997),
pp.56-61
(14)Samuel P. Huntington, "The West Unique, Not Universal", Foreign
Affairs, November/December 1996, p.45
(15)Samuel P. Huntington, "The West, Civilizations, and Civilization"
(16)Samuel P. Huntington, "The West, Civilizations, and Civilization"
(17)James Kurth, "The Real Clash", The National Interest, No. 37 (Fall
1994), pp. 3-15.
(18)Samuel P. Huntington, "The West, Civilizations, and Civilization"
(19)Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?", "The West,
Civilizations, and Civilization" and , "If Not Civilizations, What?:
Paradigms of the Post-Cold War World"
(20)Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart, ibid, p.14
(21)Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?", p.22
(22)Marc Gopin, "Foreword", in Shireen T. Hunter, "The Future of Islam
and the West: Clash of Civilizations or Peaceful Coexistence",
(Westport, CT: Preager and CSIS, 1998) and Fouad Ajami, "The
Summoning", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No.4 (September-October 1993),
p.7
(23)Shireen T. Hunter, "The Future of Islam and the West: Clash of
Civilizations or Peaceful Coexistence?", Fouad Ajami, M.E Ahrari, "The
Clash of Civilizations: An Old Story or New Truth?", Yuksel Sezgin,
"Does Islam Pose A Threat to the West?" Perceptions: Journal of
International Affairs, Vol. 5, No. 2, (June-August 2000)
(24)Shireen T. Hunter, "The Future of Islam and the West: Clash of
Civilizations or Peaceful Coexistence?", pp.19-20
(25)Fouad Ajami, ibid
(26)Richard E. Rubenstein and Jarle Crocker, "Challenging Huntington",
Foreign Policy, No. 96 (Fall 1994), p.115-117 and Hans Kung,
"Inter-Cultural Dialogue Versus Confrontation" (Chapter9), in Henrik
Schmiegelow (Ed.), Preventing The Clash of Civilizations: A Peace
Strategy for the Twenty-First Century (Roman Herzog With comments by
Amitai Etzioni, Hans Kung, Bassam Tibi, and Masakazu Yamazaki) (New
York: St Martin's Press, 1999), p. 103
(27)Hans Kung, "Inter-Cultural Dialogue Versus Confrontation" p.102
and Mahmood Monshipouri and Gina Petonito, "Constructing The Enemy in
the Post-Cold War Era…"
(28)Seifudein Adem Hussien, "On the End of History and the Clash of
Civilization: A Dissenter's View", Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs,
Vol. 21, No. 1 (2001), p. 32
(29)G. John Ikenberry, "Just Like the Rest", Foreign Affairs
(March-April 1997), p. 163, Richard E. Rubenstein and Jarle Crocker,
"Challenging Huntington", Foreign Policy, No. 96 (Fall 1994), p.117
(30)John L. Esposito, Political Islam: Revolution, Radicalism or
Reform, (Boulder, Co: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1997), Shireen T.
Hunter, "The Future of Islam and the West: Clash of Civilizations or
Peaceful Coexistence", Robert Marks, "The Clash of Civilizations and
the Remaking of World Order" (Book Review), Journal of World History,
Vol.11, No. 1 (Spring 2000), pp. 101-104, Richard Rosecrance, "The
Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order", (Book
Review), American Political Science Review, Vol.92, No.4 (December
1998), p978-980, John C. Raines, "The Politics of Religious
Correctness: Islam and the West", Cross Currents, Vol. 46, No. 1
(Spring 1996), pp.39-49 (It is available at:
http://www.crosscurrents.org/Raines2.htm) On conceptions of 'West' and
'Islam', especially see; Mohammed Arkoun and John Bowden, "Is Islam
Threatened by Christianity", Cross Currents, Vol. 45 No. 4 (Winter
1995-96), pp. 469-478, and Mohammed Arkoun, Rethinking Islam: Common
Questions, Uncommon Answers, Translated and edited by Robert D. Lee,
(Oxford: Westview Press, 1994)
(31)James Kurth, "The Real Clash"
(32)James Kurth, "American and the West: Global Triumph or Western
Twilight?", ORBIS (Summer 2001), pp.333-341
(33)Fred Halliday, Islam and the Myth of Confrontation: Religion, and
Politics in the Middle East (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996), p.
217 cited in Mahmood Monshipouri, "The West's Modern Encounter With
Islam: From Discourse to Reality", Journal of Church and State, Vol.
40, No.1 (Winter 1998), pp. 25-56
(34)Edward W. Said, "The Clash of Ignorance", The Nation, October 22
2001 and Mahmood Monshipouri, "The West's Modern Encounter With Islam:
From Discourse to Reality".
(35)See 30th note.
(36)Ibrahim Kalin, "Islam and the West: Deconstructing Monolithic
Perceptions- A Conversation with Professor John Esposito", Journal of
Muslim Minority Affairs, Vol. 21, No. 1 (2001), pp. 155-163
(37)M.E Ahrari, ibid, Shireen T. Hunter, "The Future of Islam and the
West: Clash of Civilizations or Peaceful Coexistence?", p.25
(38)Shireen T. Hunter, "The Future of Islam and the West: Clash of
Civilizations or Peaceful Coexistence?", p.169. On Turkish-Israeli
relations in the 1990s see also; Engin I. Erdem, From Rapprochement to
Strategic Partnership: Turkish-Israeli Relations in the 1990s,
Unpublished Master's Thesis, (Istanbul: Fatih University, 2001)
(39)Mahmood Monshipouri and Gina Petonito, ibid
(40)Robert Marks, "The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of
World Order" (Book Review)
(41)Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?", pp.24-25
(42)Fouad Ajami, p. 7-8
(43)Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?" pp.35-36
(44)Shireen T. Hunter, "The Future of Islam and the West: Clash of
Civilizations or Peaceful Coexistence?" p.
(45)Seizaburo Sato, "The Clash of Civilizations: A View from Japan",
Asia Pacific Review (October 1997) It is available at
http://sbpark.com/inn60.html.
(46)Ibrahim Kalin, ibid, p.156
(47)Mahmood Monshipouri and Gina Petonito, ibid, and Ibrahim Kalin, p.155
(48)Edward W. Said, "The Clash of Ignorance"
(49)Manochehr Dorraj, "In The Throes of Civilizational Conflict",
Peace Review, Vol. 10, No. 4 (December 1998), pp. 633-637
(50)Ibrahim Kalin, ibid, p.155
(51)Kishore Mahbubani, "The West and the Rest", National Interest,
Issue 28, (Summer 1992), pp.10-14
(52)Mahmood Monshipouri and Gina Petonito, ibid, Dario Battistella,
"Recherche Ennemi Desesperement… Response a Samuel P. Huntington a
propos d'un affrontement a venir entre l'Occident et l'Islam",
Confluences Mediterranee, No. 40 (Winter 2001-2002)
(53)Edward W. Said, "The Clash of Ignorance", Naz Wasim, "Challenging
Samuel Huntington's 'The Clash of Civilizations': The Shared Tradition
of Europe and Islam" in International Conference on the Dialogue of
Civilizations, 31 July to 3 August 2001, Tokyo and Kyoto,
http://www.unu.edu/dialogue/conf-report.pdf, For the UNU Project on
the Dialogue of Civilizations, see also http://www.unu.edu/dialogue
(54)Hans Kung, "Inter-Cultural Dialogue Versus Confrontation", p.102
(55)Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart, ibid, p.11-12
(56)Manus I. Midlarsky, "Democracy and Islam: Implications for
Civilizational Conflict and the Democratic Peace', International
Studies Quarterly, Vol. 42, No.3, 1998, pp.485-511
(57)Bruce M. Russett, John R. Oneal, Michaelene Cox, "Clash of
Civilizations, or Realism and Liberalism Deju Vu? Some evidence",
Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 37, No.5 (September 2000), pp.583-608
and "Clash of Civilizations, or Realism and Liberalism Deju Vu?' in
Bruce Russett and John R. Oneal, Triangulating Peace: Democracy,
Interdependence, and International Organizations (New York:
W.W.Norton, 2001)
(58)John Hertz and Robert Jervis has first brought 'security dilemma'
into the disciplinary agenda. "The anarchic nature of world politics
leads to a situation known as the security dilemma. The security
dilemma arises when a state feels insecure and decides that its best
policy is to increase its military strength. Its objective in doing so
is not [necessarily] to enhance its aggressive power, but only to
increase its ability to defend against attack. Unfortunately, a
neighboring country may then feel threatened by this increase of
aggressive potential. The second state might then pursue its own
military buildup. An unintended spiral thus occurs, where every nation
grows more and more insecure and seeks to stay as defended as
possible". Stephen L. Spiegel and Fred L. Wehling, World Politics in a
New Era (Orlando: Harcourt Brace College Publishers, 1995), p.8 See
also; John Hertz "Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma",
World Politics, Vol. 2, No. 2 (1950), pp.157-80, Robert Jervis,
"Cooperation Under The Security Dilemma", World Politics, Vol. 30,
No.2 (1978) and "Was the Cold War a Security Dilemma?" Journal of Cold
War Studies, Vol. 3, No.1 (2001), pp.36-60, Charles L. Glasser, "The
Security Dilemma Revisited" World Politics, Vol. 50, No.1 (1997), pp.
171-201
(59)G. John Ikenberry, "Just Like the Rest", p.162-163
(60)Kishore Mahbubani, ibid, and Seizaburo Sato, ibid
(61)For example; International Conference on Dialogue of
Civilizations, London 27-28 October 2000,
http://www.islamic-studies.org/dialconfer, International Conference on
the Dialogue of Civilizations, 31 July to 3 August 2001, Tokyo and
Kyoto, http://www.unu.edu/dialogue/conf-report.pdf, For the UNU
Project on the Dialogue of Civilizations, see also
http://www.unu.edu/dialogue, Okinawa Declaration, The International
Conference on Dialogue of Civilizations: A New peace Agenda for a New
Millennium (Okinawa, February 11-13, 2000),
http://www.dialoguecentre.org/PDF/Okinawa%20Declaration.pdf, and
OIC-EU Joint Forum (Istanbul, February 12-13, 2002) For a brief
summary of the proceedings of the forum see;
http://www.mfa.gov.tr/OIC-EU-Forum/summary.htm
(62)For instance, after the September 11 events American president
George W. Bush expressed that "Islam is a religion of peace". Cited in
Richard W. Bulliet, "The Crisis Within Islam", The Wilson Quarterly,
Vol. 26, No.1 (Winter 2002), pp. 11-19 On this issue see also; James
A. Beverley, "Is Islam a Religion of Peace", Christianity Today,
January 7, 2002
(http://www.christianitytoday.com/ct/2002/001/1.32.html)
(63)On Islam and Terror issue see; John L. Esposito, Unholy War:
Terror in the Name of Islam (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002),
Ladan Boroumand and Roya Boroumand, "Terror, Islam, and Democracy",
Journal of Democracy, Vol. 13, No. 2 (April 2002), pp.5-20
(64)The GALLUP Org, The 2002 Gallup Poll of the Islamic World,
http://www.gallup.com/poll/summits/islam.asp and USA Today, Poll
Results, February 27, 2002,
http://www.usatoday.com/news/attack/2002/02/27/usat-pollresults.htm
(65)Turkey, Muslim country, took command of the International Security
Assistance Force in Afghanistan by June 2002. See for instance; BBC
News, "Turkey Confirms ISAF Command", April 29, 2002
(http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/europe/newsid_1957000/1957866.stm),
and Turkish Daily News, "Turkey take command of ISAF", June 21, 2002
(http://www.turkishdailynews.com/old_editions/06_21_02/for.htm#f6)
(66)Shibley Telhami, Conference, "The United States, Europe, and the
Muslim World: Revitalizing Relations After September 11", May 14-15,
2002, CSIS: Islam Program, Washington D.C. For European criticisms see
also; 81st note.
(67)Interestingly, Graham Fuller talks about a 'vicious circle'.
"Under such conditions, it should not be surprising that these
frustrated populations perceive the current war against terrorism as
functionally a war against Islam. Muslim countries are the chief
target, they contend, Muslims everywhere are singled out for censure
and police attention, and U.S power works its will across the region
with little regard for deeper Muslim concerns. A vicious circle
exists: dissatisfaction leads to anti=regime action, which leads to
repression, which in turn leads to terrorism, U.S military
intervention, and finally further dissatisfaction. Samuel Huntington's
theory of a "clash of civilizations" is seemingly vindicated before
the Muslim world's eyes". Graham E. Fuller, "The Future of Political
Islam", Foreign Affairs, March/April 2002, p.54
(68)On the protests see, for instance; USA Today, "Amid protests, Bush
arrives in Europe", May 22, 2002
(http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2002/05/22/bush-europe.htm)
(69)Samuel P. Huntington, "The Age of Muslim Wars", Newsweek, Vol.
138, No. 25, (December 17 2001), pp. 42-47
(70)On Muslims in the West see, for example; Fawaz A. Gerges, "Islam
and Muslims in the Mind of America: Influences on the Making of U.S
Policy", Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 26, No. 2 (Winter 1997),
pp. 68-80, Michael W. Suleiman, ibid, Shireen T. Hunter (Ed.), Islam,
Europe's Second Religion: The New Social, Cultural, and Political
Landscape (Westport, CT: Praeger/CSIS, 2002), Shireen T. Hunter and
Huma Malik (Eds), Islam in Europe and the United States: A Comparative
Perspective, (Washington, D.C: Center for Strategic and International
Studies, 2002), Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad and John L. Esposito, Muslims on
the Americanization Path? (Atlanta, Ga: Scholars Press, 1998), Yvonne
Yazbeck Haddad, "Muslims in U.S. Politics: Recognized and Integrated,
or Seduced and Abandoned?", SAIS Review Vol.21., No.2 (Summer-Fall
2001), pp. 91-102, Muqtedar Khan, "Nice But Tough: A Framework for U.S
Foreign Policy in the Muslim World", The Brown Journal of World
Affairs, Vol.9, No.1 (Spring 2002), pp. 355-362 and American Muslims:
Bridging Faith and Freedom (Beltsville, MD: Amana Publications, 2002)
(71)There is abundant literature on Islam, Islam-the West relations.
For example see; Akbar S. Ahmed, Discovering Islam: Making Sense of
Muslim History and Society (New York, Routledge, 2002), Bernard Lewis,
"The Roots of Muslim Rage: Why So Many Muslims Deeply Resent the West,
and Why Their Bitterness Will Not Be Easily Mollified", Islam and the
West (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994) and What Went Wrong?
Western Impact and Middle Eastern Response (New York, Oxford
University Press, 2001), Edward Said, Orientalism (New York: Pantheon,
1978) and, Covering Islam: How the Media and the Experts Determine How
We See the Rest of the World, 2nd ed. (New York: Pantheon, 1997), Fred
Halliday, Islam and the Myth of Confrontation: Religion and Politics
in the Middle East, Hans Kung and Jurgen Moltmann (Eds.), "Islam: A
Challenge for Christianity", Concilium: International Journal for
Theology, 1994/3. For the content of this special issue see
http://www.concilium.org/english/ct943.htm, Ibrahim Kalin, "Islam and
the West: Deconstructing Monolithic Perceptions- A Conversation with
Professor John Esposito", Imamd-ad-Dean and Ahmad Yousef (Eds.), Islam
and the West- A Dialogue (Springfield, VA: United Association of
Studies and Research and American Muslim Foundation, 1998), John L.
Esposito, The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality? (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1992), and "Islam & Christianity Face to Face: An
Old Conflict & Prospects for a New Ending", Commonweal, Vol.124, No.2
(January 31, 1997), pp.11-16, John L. Esposito and John O. Voll,
"Islam and the West: Muslim Voices of Dialogue", Millennium: Journal
of International Studies, Volume 29, No. 3 -Special Issue: Religion
and International Relations, Mahmood Monshipouri, "The West's Modern
Encounter With Islam: From Discourse to Reality", Mohammed Arkoun, "Is
Islam Threatened by Christianity", and Rethinking Islam: Common
Questions, Uncommon Answers, Translated and edited by Robert D. Lee,
(Oxford: Westview Press, 1994), Robert Satloff, John L. Esposito,
Shibley Telhami, "Foreign Policy Debate" Propaganda, the Satans, and
Other Misunderstandings", SAIS Review, Vol. 21, No. 2 (Summer-Fall
2001), pp. 139-154 (See also other articles in this issue of
SAIS-Review), Shireen T. Hunter, "The Future of Islam and the West:
Clash of Civilizations or Peaceful Coexistence?", Shireen T. Hunter
(Ed.), The Future of Islam-West Relations: A CSIS Islamic Studies
Conference Report, (Washington D.C: Center for Strategic and
International Studies, June 30 1998)
(72)Michael W. Suleiman, "Islam, Muslims and Arabs in America: The
Other of the Other of the Other…", Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs,
Vol. 19, No. 1 (1999), p.37-44
(73)Ibrahim Kalin, ibid, p.156
(74)John L. Esposito, Political Islam: Revolution, Radicalism or
Reform, (Boulder, Co: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1997)
(75)M.E Ahrari, ibid
(76)On 'Islamic Fundamentalism', 'Islamism' and 'Political Islam' see;
Bessam Tibi, The Challenge of Fundamentalism? Political Islam and the
New World Disorder (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998),
Bobby S. Sayyid, A Fundamental Fear: Eurocentrism and the Emergence of
Islamism (London, Zed 1997), Gilles Kepel, Jihad: the Trail of
Political Islam (MA: Harvard University Press, 2002), Graham E.
Fuller, "The Future of Political Islam", Ibrahim A. Karawan, The
Islamist Impasse, Adelphi Paper 314, (London, Oxford University
Press/International Institute for Strategic Studies 1997) Jillian
Schwedler, "Islamic Identity: Myth, Menace, or Mobilizer?" SAIS
Review, Vol. 21, No.2 (Summer-Fall 2001), pp. 1-17, Joel Beinin and
Joe Stork (Eds.), Political Islam, John L. Esposito, Political Islam:
Revolution, Radicalism or Reform, (Boulder, Co: Lynne Rienner
Publishers, 1997), Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby (Eds.), The
Fundamentalism Project: A Series From the University of Chicago Press,
(1991-1995, Five Volumes), Shireen T. Hunter, "The Future of Islam and
the West: Clash of Civilizations or Peaceful Coexistence?", and Tariq
Ali, The Clash of Fundamentalisms: Crusades, Jihads and Modernity (New
York: VERSO, 2002)
(77)For arguments, which see Islam and democracy as compatible see
Abdulaziz Sachedina, Islamic Roots of Democratic Pluralism (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2001), Gudrun Kramer, "Islam and Pluralism"
in Rex Brynen Bahgat Korany, Paul Noble eds, Political Liberalization
and Democratization in the Arab World: Theoretical Perspectives
(Boulder" Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995), pp. 113-128, John L.
Esposito and John O. Voll, Islam and Democracy (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1996), Yahya Sadowsky, "The New Orientalism and the
Democracy Debate", in Joel Beinin and Joe Stork (eds.), Political
Islam (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), pp. 33-50. For
an interesting and somehow different approach see; Fethullah Gulen, "A
Comparative Approach to Islam and Democracy", SAIS Review, Vol. 21,
No. 2 (Summer-Fall 2001), pp. 133-138
(78)As mentioned before, Huntington has made fundamental even
revolutionary changes in his Newsweek article of December 2001, in
which he says here the conflict is possible but not inevitable.
(79)On unilateral- multilateral debate, see Joseph S. Nye's recent
study; The Paradox of American Power: Why the World's Only Superpower
Can't Go It Alone (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002)
(80)For instance, Shibley Telhami suggest that anti-Americanism in the
Muslim World in aftermath of September 11 is also almost an equal
reality in other parts of the world. CSIS Conference, "Conference,
"The United States, Europe, and the Muslim World: Revitalizing
Relations After September 11".
(81)On European criticisms of the U.S "unilateralism", for instance,
see William Pfaff, "The Coming Clash of Europe with America", World
Policy Journal, 15 (Winter 1998), pp. 1-9, Pascal Boniface, "The
Specter of Unilateralism", The Washington Quarterly, 24 (Summer 2001),
pp.155-162, William Wallace, "Europe, The Necessary Partner (American
Foreign Relations)", Foreign Affairs, 80 (May-June 2001), pp.16-34 and
Jessica T. Mathews, "U.S- Europe: Estranged Partners", January 11,
2002. (http://www.state.gov/s/p/of/proc/tr/7796.htm) Moreover, the
results of two polls are quite interesting to show European criticism
of perceived US unilateralism and the Bush administration. First poll
was conducted before the September 11 (August 2001) and it showed that
'overwhelming majorities of Europeans describe George W. Bush as
unilateral only with U.S. interests'. The second poll was conducted
after the September 11 (April 2002) and it demonstrated a much more
support to the Bush's foreign policy. However, European people have
been still very anxious about the Bush administration's policies and
rhetoric of 'war against terrorism' and 'axis of evil'. Large
majorities of Europeans (up to 85 percent of Germans) said that 'the
U.S not taking the allies' interests into account in its conduct of
the war on terror. "Bush Gets Low Marks in Europe", International
Herald Tribune, August 15, 2001 and "Bush's marks rise in Europe in
Europe", International Herald Tribune, April 17, 2002.
(82)Samuel P. Huntington, "The Age of Muslim Wars"
(83) Ibid.
(84)On the role of religion in international relations see;
Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Volume 29, No. 3
-Special Issue: Religion and International Relations-
(85)Indonesian President Abdurrahman Wahid uses this phrase. Sydney
Morning Herald, "The Clash of Civilizations?", April 17, 2002
(86)Cited in John C. Raines, "The Politics of Religious Correctness:
Islam and the West", Cross Currents, Vol. 46, No. 1 (Spring 1996),
pp.39-49 It is available at http://www.crosscurrents.org/Raines2.htm
(87)"Henry Nau, "Chapter 7:Beyond Indifference: American Relations
with the Developing World" in At Home Abroad: Identity and Power in
American Foreign Policy (Cornell Studies in Political Economy), (New
York: Cornell University Press, 2002), pp. 190-236
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